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Offering a cautionary lesson of contemporary significance, the 
Article suggests that judicial power is not in and of itself the solution 
to executive infringements on due process rights in wartime.  It 
examines the response of the British judiciary to serious threats to its 
institutional power during the First World War.  To facilitate 
prosecution of the war, the government narrowed the jurisdiction of 
the traditional courts by eliminating jury trial, subjecting civilians to 
court-martial, and establishing new administrative tribunals to 
displace the traditional courts.  Rather than remaining passive and 
deferential to the executive, as scholars have generally assumed, the 
judges moved forcefully to assert control over rival executive and 
military bodies.  Even more critically, they used their enlarged power 
to shape the legal process in accordance with a distinctive moral 
ideology.  Judicial wartime decisions reflected not a neutral rule of 
procedural propriety but a moral calculus that enhanced procedural 
rights for litigants who advanced the war effort and curtailed them 
for those who obstructed it.  Thus, the Article generally argues that 
during the war the judiciary aggressively pursued its institutional 
self-interest and employed its resulting power to allocate procedural 
entitlements in a manner that undermined the rule of law.  
Understanding the role of the judiciary in this earlier conflict may 
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encourage the heightened vigilance necessary to secure a full and fair 
judicial process to all litigants in times of war. 
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INTRODUCTION 
n western democracies a state of war generally enlarges executive 
power and erodes individual rights, and the judiciary often emerges 
as the supposed guarantor of personal freedoms and a fair legal 
process.  Executive or legislative efforts to curtail judicial power, 
such as the recent Military Commissions Act1 in the United States 
eliminating habeas corpus jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees, 
raise concerns about potentially unrestrained executive conduct.  
Britain during World War I provides an interesting case study of the 
struggle between different branches of government for control over 
the legal process in wartime, and it offers two particularly significant 
lessons.  First, it illustrates that regardless of the formal legal regime 
imposed by the government, judges have many tools at their disposal 
to shape legal procedures and institutions to promote their collective 
self-interest.  Second, and more significantly, it suggests that in 
wartime the judiciary will not necessarily produce a procedural 
regime that fully protects due process rights.  On the contrary, the 
English experience during this first global conflict demonstrates that 
an aggressive judiciary may use its power not to secure a fair legal 
process but rather to distort the rule of law. 
Responding to the pressures of World War I, the British 
government undertook a series of initiatives aimed at narrowing the 
authority of the traditional courts.  First, it constricted the jurisdiction 
of the common law courts in both civil and criminal cases.  Its 
declaration of war in August 1914 transformed many residents into 
 
1 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2623 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) (2008)). 
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enemy aliens with no right of access to the civil courts; shortly 
thereafter it introduced emergency legislation eliminating jury trial 
and vesting criminal jurisdiction over wartime offenses in 
magistrates’ courts and military tribunals.  Second, to expedite the 
adjudication of disputes in areas essential to the war effort, including 
conscription and munitions production, the executive created new 
administrative agencies with specialized “judicial” functions.  Third, 
the government established new military courts in Ireland with 
competing jurisdiction over civilians.  This Article argues that the 
judges in the traditional courts did not, as scholars have generally 
assumed, passively acquiesce in these executive encroachments.2  In 
the sphere of legal procedures and institutions, no less than that of 
substantive law,3 they responded to events quickly and forcefully.  
They enlarged their jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases, 
insisted on a power of review over the new administrative bodies, and 
asserted supremacy over rival military courts.  During World War I, 
in short, the British judiciary buttressed and even amplified its 
institutional power. 
This development, however, is only one part of a complex story, as 
power must be used to a purpose.  The other critical element is that 
the judges directed their power to the service of a particular objective: 
infusing the legal process with a moral ideology adapted to the 
exigencies of military struggle.  Beyond preserving their institutional 
self-interest, the judges embedded in the law a moral framework that 
they believed would facilitate prosecution of the war.  On issues of 
 
2 See, e.g., K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES:  
POLITICAL FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW IN BRITAIN, 1914–1945, at 36 (2000) 
(observing that during Word War I the judiciary was “compliant” to a “largely 
unaccountable” executive); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: 
DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN 6–7, 25 (1992) (referring to the 
“strength of the British judicial tradition of faithfully supporting the executive in cases 
involving security”); CHARLES TOWNSHEND, MAKING THE PEACE: PUBLIC ORDER AND 
PUBLIC SECURITY IN MODERN BRITAIN 78 (1993) (commenting on the “wartime 
complaisance of the judiciary”); DAVID WILLIAMS, NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  THE 
PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN DEMOCRACY 187 (1965) (noting that in wartime the judges 
extended “considerable indulgence” to the executive); George J. Alexander, The Illusory 
Protection of Human Rights by National Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. 
RTS. L.J. 1, 28 (1984) (observing that in wartime the British courts “will not question the 
acts of the government”). 
3 See Rachel Vorspan, Law and War: Individual Rights, Executive Authority, and 
Judicial Power in England During World War I, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 261 (2005) 
(arguing that through wartime rulings in cases involving individual substantive rights, the 
judges vigorously pursued a particular institutional, political, and moral agenda). 
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procedural as well as substantive rights,4 judicial decisions reflected 
an implicit moral consensus that litigants should enjoy rights based on 
their perceived contributions to the national struggle.  Wartime 
decisions embodied not a neutral rule of procedural propriety but a 
moral calculus that enhanced procedural entitlements for litigants who 
advanced the war effort and curtailed them for those who obstructed 
it.  Accordingly, “undeserving” litigants such as criminal defendants, 
draft evaders, and Irish rebels received fewer procedural protections 
than “deserving” parties such as munitions workers and “innocent” 
alien detainees. 
Thus, this Article contends that the judges both aggressively 
pursued their institutional self-interest during the war and employed 
their resulting power to shape procedural rights according to a 
distinctive set of wartime moral values.  Corresponding to these 
broader points, this Article is divided into two parts.  Part I describes 
the wartime challenges to the traditional courts and demonstrates that 
the judiciary asserted its authority by treating all potentially 
encroaching “judicial” entities —magistrates’ courts, administrative 
tribunals, and military courts — as “inferior courts” equally subject to 
its authority and oversight.  Part II argues that the judges used their 
institutional power to disseminate a bellicose wartime moral vision, 
and it explores in particular the fate of three particular groups of 
litigants: criminal defendants, enemy aliens, and applicants before 
administrative tribunals. 
The Conclusion suggests that to understand fully the judicial role 
in wartime Britain, scholars must move beyond assessing the 
judiciary’s impact on “substantive” rights such as personal freedom 
and begin to examine the way judges applied procedural rights 
contextually to achieve a new wartime balance of institutional 
powers.  Further, it offers the contemporary lesson that elevating 
judicial over executive power is not in and of itself necessarily the 
best mechanism for bolstering due process rights in wartime.  On the 
contrary, the experience of World War I indicates that judges 
wielding power and driven by a moralistic view of wartime 
imperatives can produce a procedural regime woefully inadequate to 
provide a robust and fair judicial process to all litigants. 
 
4 See id. at 329–40 (arguing that in deciding cases involving substantive rights, the 
World War I judges were driven by a moral ideology that differentiated among litigants 
based on their perceived contribution to the war effort). 
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I 
WARTIME CHALLENGES AND THE ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL 
INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
During the First World War, the British government challenged the 
authority of the traditional “superior”5 courts in three distinct ways: it 
narrowed their jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters, created new 
administrative entities with “judicial” features to handle specialized 
wartime problems, and established military courts in Ireland with 
rival jurisdiction over civilians.  Far from acquiescing in these 
developments, the judges fought successfully to bolster and 
accentuate their own institutional power. 
A.  The Traditional Justice System: The Challenge of Diminished 
Jurisdiction 
The judiciary faced significant wartime challenges to its authority 
in the spheres of both civil and criminal law.  In the civil arena the 
war deprived a significant segment of the population of access to civil 
justice, while in the criminal domain it led to the transfer of 
jurisdiction over wartime offenses from common law to military and 
magistrates’ courts. 
1.  Civil Procedure: Admitting Enemy Aliens to the Civil Courts 
On August 4, 1914, by the simple act of proclaiming war, the 
British government transformed a large segment of the foreign 
population6 into enemy aliens7 who under common law precedent lost 
their right to bring civil lawsuits.  The judges met this challenge of 
diminished civil jurisdiction by altering the common law to restore 
the excluded residents: in successive stages they admitted enemy 
 
5 This Article uses the term “superior” courts to refer to the High Court (containing the 
Divisional Courts of Chancery and King’s Bench), the Court of Appeal, and the House of 
Lords.  These bodies are contrasted with “inferior” courts such as magistrates’ courts, 
courts-martial, and administrative tribunals, which were not presided over by judges and 
were bound by superior court decisions issued either on direct appeal or via the writs of 
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus. 
6 There were approximately 75,000 foreigners in Britain upon the outbreak of war.  See 
76 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Nov. 24, 1915) 313; 83 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (June 
29, 1916) 1068–71; see also J.C. BIRD, CONTROL OF ENEMY ALIEN CIVILIANS IN GREAT 
BRITAIN, 1914–1918, at 6–9 (1986); 1 JAMES WILFORD GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE WORLD WAR 73 (1920). 
7 The term actually used during World War I was “alien enemy,” but this Article 
employs modern usage except where the term is directly quoted. 
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aliens to the courts as defendants, allowed enemy aliens in Britain to 
sue as plaintiffs, and permitted even enemy aliens in hostile territory 
to bring actions in British courts. 
a.  Enemy Aliens As Defendants: Creating a Right to Appear in the 
British Courts 
Prior to the First World War, no case in English law directly held 
that an enemy alien could be sued in the English courts.8  In 1915, 
however, the groundbreaking decision of Robinson & Co. v. 
Continental Insurance Co.9 expressly opened the door to suits against 
enemy defendants.  The case involved an action by British subjects to 
recover a loss under a policy of marine insurance from a German 
insurance company operating in Germany.  The defendant firm 
claimed that as an enemy alien, it could not be sued in the English 
courts for the duration of the war.  Mr. Justice Bailhache, however, 
fortified by an eighteenth-century treatise and a series of American 
decisions, concluded that to suspend a subject’s right of suit against 
an enemy alien would pointlessly injure British subjects.  The reason 
for precluding suits by enemy plaintiffs was that it was “contrary to 
public policy for the Courts of this country to render any assistance to 
an alien enemy,”10 a rationale that obviously did not apply in the case 
of alien defendants. 
Equally significant, the High Court further ruled that upon being 
sued, an enemy alien had full rights to appear and defend himself.  
Any other course “would be opposed to the fundamental principles of 
justice,” as not even a state of war could “demand or justify the 
condemnation by a Civil Court of a man unheard.”11  The full Court 
of Appeal approved Robinson in Porter v. Freudenberg,12 agreeing 
that while suits against enemy aliens would enable the King’s subjects 
to enforce their rights against the enemy, preventing an enemy alien 
from being heard in his own defense “would be quite contrary to the 
basic principles guiding the King’s Courts in the administration of 
 
8 Lord Scrutton, a judge on the Court of Appeal, noted in a lecture delivered in 1918 
that the point had not been decided until the war.  T.E. Scrutton, The War and the Law, 34 
L.Q.R. 116, 123 (1918); see Robinson & Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., [1915] 1 K.B. 155, 159–
61; Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K.B. 857, 882 (C.A.). 
9 [1915] 1 K.B. 155. 
10 Id. at 159–60. 
11 Id. at 161.  However, the court ruled that if the defense was successful, the alien’s 
right to receive costs would be suspended until the war was over.  Id. at 162. 
12 [1915] 1 K.B. 857 (C.A.). 
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justice.”13   This new rule, ostensibly showcasing English principles 
of justice,14 also had the indisputable effect of extending the 
jurisdiction of the traditional courts to a new category of defendants. 
b.  Enemy Aliens As Plaintiffs: Creating a Right to Sue 
The courts soon adopted an even more unprecedented and 
aggressive stance, allowing enemy aliens not only to defend 
themselves but also to sue as plaintiffs.  If at the beginning of the war 
enemy aliens had no access to the courts as defendants, a fortiori they 
could not be plaintiffs.  Indeed, there was substantial judicial 
authority to this effect.15  As the Court of Appeal pronounced in 
1915, under the “ancient common law”16 an enemy alien “cannot sue 
or proceed in the civil Courts of the realm.”17 
Although the courts theoretically maintained this principle 
throughout the war, in a series of deft legal maneuvers they redefined 
the term “enemy alien” to exclude from its scope anyone lawfully in 
 
13 Id. at 880, 883.  Moreover, a defendant who lost a case had a right to appeal.  As the 
Court of Appeal stated in Porter, if the judgment went against the alien, “the appellate 
Courts are as much open to him as to any other defendant.”  Id. at 883.  An enemy alien 
defendant was not, however, allowed to institute third-party proceedings, for in so doing 
he came under the procedural disability of the enemy alien plaintiff.  See Halsey v. 
Lowenfeld, [1916] 2 K.B. 707 (C.A.) (holding that an enemy alien could mount a defense 
but not initiate a third-party proceeding for indemnification). 
14 Justice also required that a defendant have actual notice of the action, but a practical 
problem was serving process on enemy alien defendants.  The German government not 
surprisingly declined to allow service on its subjects in Germany.  See Scrutton, supra note 
8, at 124.  The Legal Proceedings Against Enemies Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1, 
instituted rules of substitute service to facilitate English suits against enemy aliens.  See 
Arnold D. McNair, Alien Enemy Litigants II, 34 L.Q.R. 134, 141 (1918).  Substituted 
service could be made on agents in England or Holland where there was reason to believe 
that knowledge of the proceedings would be transmitted to the principals in Germany.  See 
Porter, [1915] 1 K.B. at 888; Scrutton, supra note 8, at 124.  Lord Reading boasted in 
Porter that English procedure was “laudably superior” to Continental law in not permitting 
constructive service.  [1915] 1 K.B. at 889. 
15 The Privy Council ruled in Re Wilson, (1916) 113 L.T. 1116 (P.C.), that anyone 
carrying on business in a hostile country must be treated as an alien enemy and that “[n]o 
action will lie by or in favour of an alien enemy in the King’s Court.”  Id. at 1116; accord 
Princess Thurn and Taxis v. Moffitt, [1915] 1 Ch. 58, 60; Porter, [1915] 1 K.B. at 873, 
880 (C.A.); Arnold D. McNair, Alien Enemy Litigants I, 31 L.Q.R. 154, 159 (1915).  The 
preclusion of enemy aliens from suit, however, was only to last for the duration of the war: 
“The remedy is indeed suspended: an alien enemy cannot sue in the Courts of either 
country while the war lasts; but the rights on the contract are unaffected, and when the war 
is over the remedy in the Courts of either is restored.”  Janson v. Driefontein Consol. 
Mines, Ltd., [1902] A.C. 484, 493 (H.L.). 
16 Porter, [1915] 1 K.B. at 869. 
17 Id. at 873. 
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Britain, including subjects of enemy states.  Adopting this stratagem 
early in the war, the courts declared that the criterion for “enemy 
alien” status was henceforth to be locality rather than nationality.  The 
new test reconceived “enemy alien” to mean a person of any 
nationality, even British, who resided or worked in enemy territory.  
Conversely, the term did not apply to persons of any nationality 
residing or working in British, allied, or neutral territory.  By 
reinterpreting the meaning of “enemy alien,” the judges extended civil 
jurisdiction to everyone residentially or commercially domiciled in 
Britain. 
Establishing this new concept of “enemy alien,” the common law 
courts in a remarkable series of decisions progressively conferred on 
enemy subjects in the United Kingdom the right to sue in tort, 
contract, property, and divorce.  The first case, Princess Thurn and 
Taxis v. Moffitt,18 was a defamation action brought by a woman 
claiming to be the wife of a Hungarian prince against another woman 
also presenting herself as the prince’s wife.  The plaintiff had 
registered as an alien as required by the Aliens Restriction Act 
1914,19 and the defendant attempted to stay the proceedings on the 
ground that an enemy alien had no right to sue.  Mr. Justice Sargant 
acknowledged that an enemy alien was generally not entitled to any 
relief at law as a plaintiff in the English courts.20  But this particular 
plaintiff, he noted, resided in the United Kingdom and had registered 
as an alien, thereby obtaining a license to remain in the country.  
Indeed, he proclaimed, the registration amounted to a “command to 
the alien enemy not to depart.”21  Persons thus allowed to remain 
were “under protection” and not subject to the disabilities of enemies. 
Later the same year, in Porter v. Freudenberg,22 the Court of 
Appeal placed its imprimatur on this broad conception of civil 
jurisdiction, confirming that registered enemy aliens in Britain were 
not enemies for purposes of judicial access.  The decision in Princess 
Thurn, the court observed, was “clearly right,”23 as the test in wartime 
 
18 [1915] 1 Ch. 58. 
19 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 1(1)(f).  Registration was required of all aliens, and it allowed 
the alien to remain during “good behaviour.”  See McNair, supra note 15, at 160. 
20 Princess Thurn, [1915] 1 Ch. at 60. 
21 Id. at 61.  In addition to being registered under section 1(1) of the Aliens Restriction 
Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 1(1)(f), “under protection” meant interned under either 
the ARA or the royal prerogative.  See 1 GARNER, supra note 6, at 119. 
22 [1915] 1 K.B. 857. 
23 Id. at 874. 
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was not nationality but the place where a person resided or carried on 
business.  An enemy subject lawfully in Britain, the court definitively 
established, was entitled to the same rights as an English resident.24  
Acknowledging that the natural meaning of “alien enemy” was a 
subject of enemy nationality, the court announced that such usage “is 
not the sense in which the term is used in reference to civil rights.”25  
The object of war was to cripple an enemy’s commerce as much as to 
capture its territory, the court reasoned, and British subjects doing 
business in hostile territory were assisting the enemy to the same 
extent as subjects of enemy nationality.26   In contrast, enemy subjects 
in Britain were under the King’s protection, and the right to sue 
flowed from this protection.27  The court thus conferred a right of 
judicial access on tens of thousands of enemy aliens and ensured that 
English law would control the disposition of their claims. 
Applying the definition of enemy alien elaborated in Porter, the 
landmark case of Schaffenius v. Goldberg28 further enlarged the rights 
of enemy subjects in Britain in two directions.  First, it extended the 
concept into commercial affairs by allowing enemy aliens to bring 
cases in contract, which comprised the bulk of litigation during World 
War I.  Second, and far more surprisingly, it brought even interned 
aliens within the scope of the new rule.29 
Schaffenius involved a German national who had resided and 
carried on business in England for twenty-two years and who at the 
outbreak of war registered as an enemy alien.  In March 1915 
Schaffenius entered into an agreement to finance a business in picture 
moldings.  Four months later he was interned, and the picture molder 
rescinded the agreement on the ground that Schaffenius was an enemy 
alien.  Schaffenius sued, and the defendant argued that internment 
operated as a revocation of the plaintiff’s protected status.  The High 
 
24 Id. at 868. 
25 Id. at 867. 
26 Id. at 867–68.  The court adopted a dictum of the House of Lords in Janson v. 
Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Ltd., [1902] A.C. 484, 505–06 (H.L.), in which Lord 
Lindley stated that “the subject of a State at war with this country, but who is carrying on 
business here or in a foreign neutral country, is not treated as an alien enemy.” 
27 Porter, [1915] 1 K.B. at 870–71. 
28 [1916] 1 K.B. 284, aff’d, [1916] 1 K.B. 296 (C.A.). 
29 In May 1915 the government undertook a campaign to intern subjects of enemy states 
in Britain, see 71 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (May 13, 1915) 1841–42, and it eventually 
detained more than 30,000 able-bodied men of military age, see 76 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th 
ser.) (Nov. 24, 1915) 313; BIRD, supra note 6, at 8–9.  The internees comprised practically 
the entire enemy population.  See 1 GARNER, supra note 6, at 73, 127. 
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Court concluded, however, that the detainee plaintiff could still 
maintain his action.  Despite the internment, he was not an enemy: he 
was not in enemy territory, and “[e]nemy character in a trading sense 
ha[d] never attached to him.”30  Presenting a justification based on 
English self-interest, the judge noted that precluding an alien internee 
from suit would “leave him liable to fulfill all his permitted 
transactions but powerless to enforce any of them, and such a result 
would not only be ruinous to the plaintiff, but speedily disastrous to 
all persons contracting with him.”31  Prima facie all English residents 
were entitled to have access to the courts, and internment was not 
only a form of residency but a guarantee that the “command to the 
alien enemy not to depart” would be obeyed.32 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that an enemy alien interned 
as a civilian prisoner of war did not lose his contractual rights.  As the 
Master of the Rolls insisted, it was in accordance with general 
principles of law that “the restraint which is imposed upon the 
personal movements of an interned German does not deprive him of 
civil rights in respect of a lawful contract.”33  Another case decided 
the same year, Nordman v. Rayner,34 confirmed the new principle that 
internment did not operate to destroy an alien’s “civil rights.”35   
Given that practically the entire alien population was interned during 
World War I, the effect of the ruling was to open the English courts to 
virtually all enemy subjects in England.36 
Taking a further step at the end of the war, the Court of King’s 
Bench expanded the causes of action available to alien plaintiffs to 
include divorce.  The plaintiff in Krauss v. Krauss37 was an Austrian 
domiciled in England and married to an Englishwoman.  When war 
broke out he applied for naturalization, was rejected, and immediately 
registered as an enemy alien.  Soon thereafter he was interned, and 
while he was under detention his wife committed adultery and gave 
birth to a child.  The court held that a registered alien could sue in the 
 
30 Schaffenius, [1916] 1 K.B. at 290.  Mr. Justice Younger observed that though an alien 
enemy plaintiff must prove that he was in the country with “license,” registration was 
sufficient evidence of such a license and internment did not revoke it.  Id. at 294–95. 
31 Id. at 291. 
32 Id. at 294–95. 
33 Id. at 302. 
34 (1916) 33 T.L.R. 87 (K.B.). 
35 Id. at 88. 
36 See 1 GARNER, supra note 6, at 127. 
37 (1919) 35 T.L.R. 637 (Prob., Divorce & Adm.). 
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English courts and that the civil actions open to him included 
divorce.38 
The courts did not restrict judicial access to aliens residing or 
working in Britain but rather extended it to enemy subjects domiciled 
or doing business in allied or neutral countries.  As noted earlier, only 
persons residing or working in enemy territory were technically 
“enemy aliens,” and by force of logic enemy subjects in countries not 
at war with Britain did not fall within the definition either.  The Court 
of Chancery explicitly endorsed this expansion of jurisdiction in 
Mary, Duchess of Sutherland v. Bubna,39 a case involving three 
partners who started a business in Paris before the war and 
subsequently sued the Duchess of Sutherland’s estate.  At the time of 
the suit in 1915, two of the partners were French subjects living in 
Paris, and the third, Siegfried David, was an Austrian subject 
apparently domiciled in Spain.  On the threshold question of whether 
David was an enemy alien and therefore barred from suit, Mr. Justice 
Warrington observed that since the test was not nationality but rather 
the place of business, and since David was neither residing nor 
working in an enemy state, the case could proceed.40  On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal reserved the question of David’s status until the trial 
because there was uncertainty as to his actual residence, but it 
confirmed the rule that an enemy subject in a neutral country could 
sue in the English courts.41  Later in the war the House of Lords 
expressly approved Duchess of Sutherland, endorsing the principle 
that nationality was “no longer a test of alienage in the enforcement of 
civil rights.”42  Thus, the judiciary skillfully dealt with the removal of 
a sizeable segment of the population from its jurisdiction by 
 
38 Id. 
39 (1915) 31 T.L.R. 248 (Ch.). 
40 Id. 
41 Mary, Duchess of Sutherland v. Bubna, (1915) 31 T.L.R. 394, 395 (C.A.). 
42 Rodriguez v. Speyer, [1919] A.C. 59, 135 (H.L.).  Such an inclusive approach to 
jurisdiction was also evident in Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 A.C. 262 (H.L.(I.)), where 
the House of Lords allowed an Irish rebel to sue the Crown to recover money seized from 
him during an arrest.  The Lords found that the plaintiff, an American citizen living in 
Ireland, was in the same position as a British subject even though he was apparently guilty 
of treason.  Relying on both Shaffenius and Porter, Lord Atkinson observed that the fact 
that Pedlar had “shown himself unworthy of the Sovereign’s protection, has abused his 
privileges and violated his allegiance” did not ipso facto terminate his right to sue.  Id. at 
285.  The Crown had not withdrawn its protection by trying him for high treason or 
expelling him from the country, and mere internment did not operate as a revocation of his 
license to remain.  Id.  The court concluded that the case could therefore proceed.  Id. at 
284–85. 
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transforming the common law to return the excluded element to its 
fold. 
c.  Enemy Subjects in Enemy Territory: Joining “True” Enemy Aliens 
The common law courts did not rest, however, with enlarging their 
jurisdiction to reach enemy subjects in British, allied, or neutral 
territory.  Broadening judicial access still further, they held that even 
enemy aliens under the revised definition —persons residing or doing 
business in hostile countries — could bring an action if doing so 
would benefit English commercial interests.  In Rodriguez v. Speyer 
Bros.,43 the House of Lords for the first time allowed a German 
national to join a suit as a coplaintiff on the ground that he was an 
indispensable party to liquidating a partnership dissolved by the war.  
The Lord Chancellor reasoned that if the British partners were unable 
to join the enemy partner to recover a debt owed to the firm, the 
company would not be able to secure its assets until the war was 
over.44  To bar the enemy alien from serving as a plaintiff in the 
action would thus harm British subjects more than it would damage 
the enemy: 
[T]here is no danger of the alien enemy’s being enriched by the 
proceedings, as none of the assets of the firm can be handed over to 
him during the war.  To apply the rule against suing to such a case 
would be to inflict hardship not on the enemy but on British and 
neutral partners. . . . [T]he question is whether the rule does exist in 
a class of cases manifestly not within the mischief at which the rule 
is aimed.45 
Concluding that it would be wrong to deny a British company the 
right to bring an action for its own protection, the Lord Chancellor 
relieved the enemy alien of his procedural “disability” where his 
presence in the lawsuit was necessary to benefit his British partners.46 
Lord Haldane, embarking on a lengthy excursion through the 
precedents, supported the Lord Chancellor’s position by pointing out 
that while the preponderance of authority treated the preclusion of 
enemy aliens as a rigid common law rule rather than as a matter of 
policy, the courts had not been unanimous on this point.47  It was 
 
43 [1919] A.C. 59 (H.L.). 
44 Id. at 68.  The English firm consisted of six partners, four of whom were British, one 
an American, and one a German.  Id. at 64–65. 
45 Id. at 71. 
46 Id. at 75. 
47 Id. at 84–85. 
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therefore open to the highest court to examine the reason for the rule, 
and in his view “the balance of public convenience is in favour of 
allowing the respondent firm to get in this debt.”48  Lord Parmoor 
reached a similar conclusion, discerning no inflexible rule of law that 
prevented an enemy alien from suing as a coplaintiff.  Applying such 
a rule in the present case, he decided, would not disadvantage the 
enemy but would rather deprive British subjects of property rights 
that “they unquestionably possess.”49  The House of Lords thus 
treated rules ensuring access to justice as flexible rules of policy 
rather than rigid rules of law in order to admit even “true” enemy 
aliens to the civil courts. 
In the course of the war, therefore, the judges transformed the 
common law rules so that everyone lawfully in Britain could sue or be 
sued, and even aliens in enemy territory could bring an action if 
necessary to protect English commercial interests.  In Johnstone v. 
Pedlar,50 decided in 1921, the House of Lords underscored the fact 
that these wartime jurisdictional changes resulted solely from judicial 
rather than executive action.  As Lord Sumner declared, the 
“foundation of these rights of action is that the Courts have defined 
their jurisdiction so as to admit them, not that the Crown has granted a 
right of suit.”51 
Taken collectively, the wartime decisions elevated judicial access 
to the status of an “elemental” right.  In 1920 the King’s Bench 
acknowledged this development in Chester v. Bateson,52 which 
invalidated an emergency regulation prohibiting a landlord from suing 
to recover property without the consent of the Minister of 
Munitions.53  Mr. Justice Darling observed that the regulation at issue 
 
48 Id. at 86–87. 
49 Id. at 136.  The judges were split three to two, with Lords Atkinson and Sumner 
dissenting.  Lord Atkinson insisted that allowing a judicial tribunal to disregard an 
established rule in a particular case would usurp the powers of the Legislature.  Id. at 90.  
In his view, the proposition that an enemy alien was disqualified from suing only in 
actions where he would be enriched had “not a shred of authority” in support.  Id. at 92.  
Lord Sumner dissented on the ground that the rule was unqualified— i t had always been 
“as curt as the Commandments”— a nd that if the enemy was a party to the action, a 
successful judgment would “enure presently, if indirectly, to his material benefit.”  Id. at 
117, 108. 
50 [1921] 2 A.C. 262 (H.L.(I.)). 
51 Id. at 291. 
52 [1920] 1 K.B. 829. 
53 CONSOLIDATED REGULATIONS, DEFENCE OF THE REALM MANUAL, Reg. 2(A)2 (5th 
ed. 1918) [hereinafter DORA CONSOL. REGS.]. 
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“deprives the subject of his ordinary right to seek justice in the Courts 
of law,”54 and he further insisted that forbidding a litigant access to 
all legal tribunals could be accomplished only by direct enactment of 
the legislature.55  Conceding that “in stress of war we may rightly be 
obliged, as we should be ready, to forgo much of our liberty,” he 
nonetheless concluded that “this elemental right of the subjects of the 
British Crown cannot be thus easily taken from them.”56  Mr. Justice 
Avory echoed this view, proclaiming that under constitutional law, a 
regulation establishing a precondition for bringing a civil suit violated 
Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights.57 
As has been shown, the courts presented a number of rationales for 
broadening civil jurisdiction, including promoting trade, protecting 
property rights, assisting British subjects, and simply “doing justice.”  
Granting judicial access to hostile subjects would facilitate 
commercial relations when peace was restored, and enforcing a 
principle of evenhanded justice would exhibit the moral superiority of 
the English legal system.  In an early plea to admit aliens to the 
British courts, the Solicitors’ Journal theorized that it was in the 
nation’s self-interest for judges to “perform their ordinary duties 
towards persons of all nations.”58  As it explained in November 1914: 
[It] cannot fail to produce a great moral effect if, while Europe is 
submerged under a sea of cruelty and violence, justice is still 
dispensed with even hand to all alike. . . .  [T]he guns of both sides 
now deal out indiscriminate destruction and slaughter in all the area 
of war.  But this will pass; peace will return; and not a little will 
have been gained if, till that day, the courts of Great Britain, like the 
courts of Germany, can stand as emblems of peace amid the 
desolation of war.59 
These considerations coalesced in a judicial policy that, in addition to 
advancing a variety of stated objectives, not incidentally also 
extended the authority of English judges and raised the stature of their 
courts. 
 
54 Chester, [1920] 1 K.B. at 834. 
55 Id. at 833. 
56 Id. at 834. 
57 Id. at 836. 
58 Civil Courts and War, 59 SOL. J. 67, 68 (Nov. 21, 1914). 
59 Id.  The article continued: “Business relations are not terminated, they are only 
suspended. . . . [W]e entertain no doubt that the proper motto for the courts is ‘Justice as 
usual.’”  Id.  It was recognized that war was “inhuman and barbarous” and should not be 
allowed to affect the procedures of civilian courts of justice.  Id. 
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2.  Criminal Procedure: Restoring Jury Trial and Controlling Courts 
of Summary Jurisdiction 
Whereas in the civil sphere diminished superior court jurisdiction 
flowed from common law rules that could be altered by the judiciary 
at will, in the criminal sphere it resulted from parliamentary action 
vesting jurisdiction over wartime offenses in lesser judicial bodies.  
Here too the courts fought to reverse the loss of authority, in this case 
by asserting a power of review over the newly empowered entities.  
Though the decisions were more circumscribed and less dramatic, the 
judges’ impulse toward institutional self-preservation was as evident 
in the criminal as civil domain. 
Successive incarnations of the Defence of the Realm Act 
(“DORA”),60 enacted in the first few months of the war, authorized 
the government to create by regulation a broad range of national 
security offenses.  In institutional terms DORA was significant 
because it conferred jurisdiction over the new crimes on summary 
magistrates’ courts and courts-martial61 rather than traditional 
superior courts offering jury trial.  The goal was to speed up the 
hearing of criminal cases, reduce procedural rights of defendants, and 
enhance available penalties.62  The elimination of jury trial and loss 
of criminal jurisdiction obviously threatened to undermine the status 
of the superior court judiciary.  Moving aggressively to restore their 
authority, the judges used their legislative capacity to secure the 
 
60 Defence of the Realm Act, Aug. 8, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29; Defence of the Realm 
Act (No. 2), Aug. 28, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 63; Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) 
Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8; Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 
1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34; Defence of the Realm (Amendment) (No. 3) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 
5, c. 42 (collectively known as “DORA”). 
61 The first Defence of the Realm Act, passed on August 8, 1914, empowered the 
government to authorize by regulation the trial by court-martial of persons who breached 
regulations designed to “prevent persons communicating with the enemy” or “secure the 
safety of any means of communication, or of railways, docks or harbours.”  4 & 5 Geo. 5, 
c. 29, § 1(a)–(b).  A second act three weeks later extended trial by court-martial to 
breaches of regulations issued to “prevent the spread of reports likely to cause disaffection 
or alarm” or secure the safety of an area used by the troops.  DORA (No. 2), 4 & 5 Geo. 5, 
c. 63, § 1(a)–(b).  The DORA Consolidation Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1(1), 
provided that the government could by regulation “authorise the trial by courts-martial, or 
in the case of minor offences by courts of summary jurisdiction” of any offenses against 
the regulations. 
62 Where trial was by court-martial, for example, the accused was subject to the death 
penalty if the offense was committed “with the intention of assisting the enemy.”  DORA 
Consol. Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1(4). 
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reinstatement of jury trial and their judicial capacity to control the 
proceedings of magistrates’ and military courts. 
As members of the House of Lords, the judges pressed forcefully 
for the restoration of trial by jury.  During a debate over DORA in the 
House of Lords in November 1914, Earl Loreburn deplored the fact 
that the legislation placed “the life of the British subject at the mercy 
of a military Court-Martial, even though the Court of Assize may be 
sitting within fifty yards.”63  Similarly, Lord Parmoor insisted that 
there was no “precedent for taking away the rights of a British subject 
as regards ordinary trial by a jury directed by a skilled Judge.”64  
According to Lord Bryce, the “constitutional protection of being tried 
by a civil Court”65 was “one of the oldest and most treasured parts of 
our Constitution,”66 while Lord Halsbury thought that there was “no 
necessity for getting rid of the fabric of personal liberty that has been 
built up for many generations.”67  Cowed by the vigor of the judges’ 
resistance, the government reversed its position.  In March 1915, 
claiming that such a drastic departure from constitutional principle 
was no longer necessary,68 the Home Secretary introduced legislation 
allowing defendants to elect jury trial in the regular courts instead of 
court-martial.69  Critically, in forcing the government to reinstate a 
fundamental right of defendants, the judges at the same time protected 
their traditional jurisdiction. 
The restoration of jury trial, however, was limited and primarily of 
symbolic importance.  It was available only to British subjects70 and 
could be abrogated by royal proclamation in the event of “invasion or 
other special military emergency arising out of the present war”71— a 
 
63 18 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Nov. 27, 1914) 207. 
64 Id. at 210. 
65 Id. at 209. 
66 Id. at 695 (Mar. 11, 1915). 
67 Id. at 208 (Nov. 27, 1914). 
68 70 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 24, 1915) 288–89. 
69 Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34, § 1(1) 
(“Any offence against any regulations made under the Defence of the Realm 
Consolidation Act, 1914, which is triable by court martial may, instead of being tried by a 
court martial, be tried by a civil court with a jury . . . .”). 
70 Neutrals or enemy aliens who committed offenses against the regulations remained 
punishable under military law.  Such cases could be transferred to a civil court at the 
discretion of the prosecuting officer.  Id.; see also Lindsay Rogers, The War and the 
English Constitution, [1915] THE FORUM 27, 30. 
71 DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 45, § 1(7).  There were also 
procedural burdens on the election of jury trial.  The accused had to make his choice 
within six days, id. § 1(2), and the use of a jury required the approval of the Attorney 
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provision implemented in Ireland in 1916 and again in 1920.72  
Moreover, the restoration had no effect on cases triable by summary 
proceeding, a category that comprised the vast majority of DORA 
cases.73  In practice, between courts-martial on the one hand and 
summary proceedings on the other, few jury trials occurred during the 
war.  Indeed, in 1917 the National Council of Civil Liberties reported 
that trial by jury had been “almost obliterated,”74 contending that 
between the “upper and nether millstones of court-martial and 
summary jurisdiction,” trial by jury was being “ground into a 
smallness, if not with that slowness, which is usually attributed to the 
mills of God.”75  Thus, the reinstatement of jury trial did not 
eliminate the serious challenges posed to the judiciary by magistrates’ 
courts and courts-martial, and the judges dealt with these threats by 
treating both bodies as “inferior courts” subject to their review. 
With respect to the magistrates’ courts,76 two cases in particular 
illustrated the vigorous exercise of superior court control.  The first 
case, Kaye v. Cole,77 limited the magistrates’ power over national 
security offenses to the duration of the war, and the second, Norman 
 
General.  DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 56(11).  If the offender made no 
claim to jury trial, the case could be tried by court-martial unless the Admiralty or Army 
Council instructed that it should not be.  Id. Reg. 56(6)(b).  If a person entitled to jury trial 
failed to elect it, it was reversible error to provide it to him.  See R. v. Kakelo, [1923] 2 
K.B. 793 (C.C.A.) (quashing a conviction because a magistrate sent a case to quarter 
sessions without a request by the prisoner).  Finally, even in a jury trial the offender was 
liable to the punishment that could be inflicted by a court-martial, with the possibility of a 
death sentence if an offense was committed with the intention of assisting the enemy.  
DORA CONSOL. REGS, supra note 53, Reg. 56A. 
72 See infra text accompanying notes 176–91. 
73 See DORA (Amendment) Act, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 45, § 1(2).  A preference for 
summary jurisdiction pervaded the regulatory scheme.  Some offenses were specifically 
vested only in courts of summary jurisdiction.  See DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, 
Reg. 56(2).  Where a person was charged with other than a summary offense, the 
competent naval or military authority was required to investigate and determine whether 
the offense could indeed be dealt with by a court of summary jurisdiction.  Id. Reg. 56(3).  
If so, the offender was to be tried only summarily.  Id. Reg. 56(5).  In a case scheduled for 
jury trial, the prosecution was required to investigate it again to determine whether 
summary proceedings might be adequate.  Id. Reg. 56(7).  The Director of Public 
Prosecutions determined the forum for press and munitions offenses, id. Reg. 56(13)–(14); 
see Fox v. Spicer, (1917) 33 T.L.R. 172 (K.B.), and the Director almost always chose 
summary trial.  See, e.g., “NORTH BRITON,” BRITISH FREEDOM 1914–1917, at 50 (1917). 
74 “NORTH BRITON,” supra note 73, at 49. 
75 Id. at 51–52. 
76 The exercise of superior court control over courts-martial is discussed infra Part I.C. 
77 (1917) 115 L.T. 783 (K.B.). 
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v. Matthews,78 dictated procedures in the magistrates’ courts.  Kaye 
involved an Oxford undergraduate convicted in a magistrate’s court 
of possessing antiwar posters in violation of a DORA regulation.79  
The defendant appealed on the ground that his prosecution was 
untimely under the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848,80 which required 
that a summary prosecution be initiated within six months of the 
offense.  The King’s Bench held that the magistrates derived their 
powers over wartime crimes exclusively from DORA — an act 
effective only for “the continuance of the present war”81— a n d 
declared the Summary Jurisdiction Act to be inoperative.82  As the 
Lord Chief Justice observed, the magistrates were able to entertain the 
case only because the military authority, acting under DORA, had 
selected a summary court as the appropriate forum.  “The jurisdiction 
is conferred by the regulations,” the court proclaimed, and was “not 
derived from the Summary Jurisdiction Acts at all.”83  The import of 
the case was that the King’s Bench put finite limits on the newly 
expanded jurisdiction of the summary courts. 
The second case, Norman v. Matthews,84 demonstrated the manner 
in which the superior courts shaped procedural rules governing 
magistrates’ courts, and it further indicated that in determining the 
contours of summary jurisdiction, the wartime judges were quite 
willing to flout executive policy.  In 1916 the police utilized a DORA 
regulation dealing with press offenses to seize newspapers in the 
possession of C.H. Norman, a left-wing journalist.85  Norman sued 
the Department of Public Prosecutions to quash an order to destroy 
the documents, and a magistrate dismissed his action in a private 
hearing.  Norman protested the fact that the hearing had been 
conducted in secret, raising an issue of some significance since closed 
 
78 [1916–17] All E.R. Rep. 696 (K.B.). 
79 Id. at 788.  The regulation criminalized statements “likely to prejudice the recruiting, 
training, discipline, or administration of any his Majesty’s forces.”  DORA CONSOL. 
REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 27(c). 
80 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43, § 11. 
81 DORA, Aug. 8, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 1. 
82 Kaye, 115 L.T. at 785. 
83 Id.  In contrast to the Summary Jurisdiction Act, a DORA regulation provided that a 
defendant could be tried by a court of summary jurisdiction even if the offense had been 
committed more than six months before institution of the proceedings.  DORA CONSOL. 
REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 56(6). 
84 [1916–17] All E.R. Rep. 696 (K.B.). 
85 Id. at 697. 
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proceedings were a common and controversial magisterial practice.86  
The government was also troubled about the magistrates’ excessive 
use of this procedure.  In 1915, for example, the Home Secretary 
issued a circular urging magistrates to exercise this power with “great 
care,”87 and he subsequently declared in Parliament that it was 
important “to maintain the good practice of public trial as far as 
possible.”88 
Ignoring the government’s position on public trials, the King’s 
Bench upheld the closure of the proceedings below on the basis that a 
court has inherent authority to hear a case in camera if “necessary for 
the proper administration of justice.”89  Significantly, the court could 
have reached the same result on the basis of statutory and regulatory 
authority: both DORA and Regulation 51A authorized in camera 
proceedings.90  Instead, however, the court chose to rely on inherent 
judicial powers.  In other words, judges displayed their independence 
by grounding their decisions in common law authority rather than on 
any powers vested in them by the executive or legislature.91 
In instances where the courts necessarily construed emergency 
statutes and regulations rather than relying on common law analysis, 
 
86 See id. at 699 (Mr. Justice Sankey noting that in numerous recent cases heard by the 
magistrates, hearings had been conducted in camera).  The National Council for Civil 
Liberties reported that magistrates generally acceded to a prosecutor’s demand that an 
entire case —not merely some part of the evidence— b e heard in camera.  See “NORTH 
BRITON,” supra note 73, at 54. 
87 See 79 J.P. 596, 597 (1915).  Two years later Lord Sheffield complained in the House 
of Lords of the magistrates’ “unreasonable use of the power of hearing cases in camera” 
and their “indifferen[ce] to these pious hopes on the part of the Secretary of State.”  24 
PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Mar. 7, 1917) 408–09. 
88 75 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Nov. 4, 1915) 810.  He also stated that “trial in 
camera should only be resorted to in so far as national interests really demand.”  Id.; see 
81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 23, 1916) 422–23. 
89 Norman, [1916–17] All E.R. Rep. at 698.  The court cautioned, however, that it 
should not hear a case in camera lightly.  To close the proceedings “is to take a very 
exceptional course, and it is a jurisdiction which ought to be exercised with the greatest 
care, and only upon the strongest grounds.”  Id. at 699. 
90 DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34, § 1(3); DORA CONSOL. 
REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 51A. 
91 In an earlier case, Ex parte Norman, (1916) 114 L.T. 232 (K.B.), Norman had 
challenged Regulation 51A itself, which provided that proceedings challenging 
confiscation of material by the police could be held in camera if the public interest so 
required.  The court concluded that the regulation was intra vires DORA, emphasizing that 
since the magistrate had the power apart from regulation to hear proceedings in camera, it 
followed that the regulation was not ultra vires.  Id. at 234.  In other words, the court 
validated a DORA regulation on the basis of a magistrate’s preexisting common law 
power to hear cases in camera. 
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the judges demonstrated their lack of subservience to other bodies by 
rejecting positions espoused by the government, the legislature, and 
the magistrates below.  For example, in cases involving the 
conscription of dual nationals, the High Court ignored both 
parliamentary intent and magistrates’ decisions effectuating that 
intent by ruling that enemy aliens were subject to military service.92  
The judges also discarded the interpretations of magistrates and 
ministers in analyzing other provisions of the Military Service Act.93  
In addition, they construed statutes to facilitate appeals from 
magistrates’ courts to higher courts, thereby ensuring the availability 
of superior court review over summary court proceedings.94 
The superior courts thus responded to the elimination of jury trial 
and the concomitant rise of magistrates’ courts by securing a key 
statutory change with respect to jury trial, closely supervising the 
proceedings of inferior courts, and rendering decisions that 
underscored judicial independence.  In the criminal no less than the 
civil sphere, the courts responded to the challenge of diminished 
jurisdiction by working assiduously and successfully to restore their 
traditional authority. 
 
92 The Military Service Act 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, § 1(1), conscripted “[e]very 
male British subject” of a certain age, and the British Nationality & Status of Aliens Act 
1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, § 14, enabled any dual national upon reaching adulthood to 
cease being a British subject.  Magistrates often sensibly interpreted the legislation to 
allow dual nationals to declare their alienage and avoid conscription.  See, e.g., Sawyer v. 
Kropp, (1916) 85 L.J.K.B. 1446, 1447; Dawson v. Meuli, (1918) 118 L.T. 357, 359 
(K.B.).  However, the High Court disregarded clear parliamentary intent in both statutes 
and insisted upon drafting enemy aliens into the British Army.  See Vorspan, supra note 3, 
at 288–93. 
93 See, e.g., Towler v. Sutton, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 46 (rejecting the position of the 
magistrate and the Crown that a recruiting officer’s refusal to accept an affirmation in 
place of a statement under oath from an atheist attempting to enlist was not a “rejection” 
from military service); R. v. Burnham, (1918) 119 L.T. 308 (K.B.) (rejecting the position 
of the magistrate and the Crown that the defendant had not been interned by the enemy 
and was therefore liable to military service under the Military Service Act). 
94 See, e.g., R. v. Campbell ex parte Moussa, [1921] All E.R. Rep. 499 (K.B.) (finding a 
right of the defendant under the Summary Jurisdiction and Criminal Justice Acts to appeal 
from a magistrate’s court to a court of general or quarter sessions).  The courts also 
interpreted criminal statutes to confer expansive jurisdiction on the English courts.  See, 
e.g., R. v. Casement, [1916–17] All E.R. Rep. 214 (C.C.A.) (interpreting the Treason Act 
1351 broadly to reach Irish rebels giving “aid and comfort to the King’s enemies” in 
Germany rather than England). 
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B.  Wartime Executive Tribunals: The Challenge of Administrative 
Encroachment 
A second wartime challenge to the authority of the traditional 
courts emanated from the new executive agencies established by the 
government to deal expeditiously with critical matters affecting the 
war.  The two primary wartime administrative entities were the 
munitions tribunals to enforce the comprehensive labor code 
established by the Munitions of War Act95 and the military service 
tribunals to decide applications for exemption under the Military 
Service Act.96  These bodies posed a particular threat to the judiciary 
because the government invested the tribunals with “judicial” features 
to enhance their legitimacy.  Utilizing judicial personnel and 
procedures, and charged with the ordinary judicial tasks of 
interpreting statutes and adjudicating disputes, the new agencies 
potentially supplanted the regular courts.  The judges responded by 
treating these bodies as equivalent to magistrates’ courts, dealing with 
them as “inferior courts” that were part of the normal judicial 
hierarchy and subject to superior court review.  Although scholars 
have assumed that such administrative entities relegated the judiciary 
to a subsidiary role during and after the war,97 the courts in fact 
 
95 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54; Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, 
c. 99; Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1917, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 45. 
96 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104.  There was also a third wartime administrative agency, an 
Advisory Committee that gave advice to the Home Secretary on internment and 
deportation orders.  DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 12.  The Chairman of the 
Committee was required to be a person who “holds or has held high judicial office,” which 
meant a judge of the High Court or above.  Id. Reg. 13.  Two High Court judges each 
chaired a subcommittee.  Sir John Sankey’s committee dealt with challenges to internment 
orders, while Sir Robert Younger’s dealt with deportation questions.  Persons ordered 
interned or detained had seven days to appeal, and after March 1916 they received a 
statement indicating the grounds on which the order had been made.  See 81 PARL. DEB., 
H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 2, 1916) 1248.  The function of the Committee was largely to give 
judicial legitimacy to the government’s internment and deportation decisions; in 
introducing the body to the House of Commons, the Home Secretary referred to it as an 
advisory body of a “judicial” character.”  See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 16. 
97 See, e.g., COLM CAMPBELL, EMERGENCY LAW IN IRELAND, 1918–1925, at 148 
(1994) (discussing the diminution of the judicial role in British legal culture owing to the 
grant of judicial and quasi-judicial powers to the executive); BARTON L. INGRAHAM, 
POLITICAL CRIME IN EUROPE 292 (1979) (noting that Britain during and between the wars 
was ruled by administrative regulations “practically free from interference by the courts”); 
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY, 
1800–1976, at 196 (1978) (contending that in the period from 1912 to 1940 “governments 
had few qualms in passing new functions of government to bodies totally unrelated to the 
regular courts,” thereby making the courts “increasingly irrelevant”); TOWNSHEND, supra 
note 2, at 66 (discussing the diminution of judicial authority after World War I); 
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energetically asserted control over these potentially encroaching 
bodies and dictated their jurisdiction, procedures, and substantive law. 
1.  Munitions Tribunals Under the Munitions of War Act 
The Munitions of War Act98 (“Munitions Act”) introduced a 
detailed scheme for regulating munitions production during the war.  
It banned strikes and lockouts, restricted labor mobility, promoted 
labor discipline, and authorized replacement of skilled workers with 
semi-skilled and female labor.99  Specific provisions of the statute 
directed the government to prohibit companies essential to armaments 
production from limiting productivity, exceeding specified profit 
margins, or altering wages without government consent.100  A 
particularly controversial clause regulated the flow of labor by 
requiring munitions workers to secure a “leaving certificate” from 
their current employer before obtaining alternate employment.101  The 
Munitions Act also empowered the Minister of Munitions to develop 
rules for individual establishments dealing with such matters as 
sobriety, diligence, and punctuality.102 
To enforce this scheme, the Munitions Act established special 
industrial courts known as “munitions tribunals.”  Initially the 
 
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 188 (observing the decline of judicial in favor of 
administrative powers and stating that “[t]housands of administrative tribunals . . . now 
exist for decisions which the courts have neither the time nor the technique to undertake”). 
98 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54. 
99 See GERRY R. RUBIN, WAR, LAW AND LABOUR: THE MUNITIONS ACTS, STATE 
REGULATION, AND THE UNIONS, 1915–1921, at 1 (1987); CHRIS WRIGLEY, DAVID LLOYD 
GEORGE AND THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT 6–7 (1976). 
100 See RUBIN, supra note 99, at 16; WRIGLEY, supra note 99, at 110–21.  A 
contemporary summarized the basic scheme for the legislation as placing both employers 
and workmen under the control of the government, supplanting strikes and lockouts with a 
system of statutory arbitration, abrogating freedom of contract, and allocating excess 
profits to the state rather than the employer.  See THOMAS ALEXANDER FYFE, EMPLOYERS 
& WORKMEN UNDER THE MUNITIONS OF WAR ACTS 1915–1917, at 2–3 (3d ed. 1918). 
101 If an employer refused the certificate, the worker was not permitted to work for 
another employer for six weeks.  Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54, § 7(1); 
see GERD HARDACH, THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914–1918, at 188 (1977) (noting that few 
workers could afford to forego wages for six weeks); Munitions Tribunals, 31 JURID. REV. 
152, 154 (1919) (commenting that no provision of the Act was more disliked by workers).  
Workers particularly resented employers who suspended workers without giving them 
leaving certificates in order to create a reserve of labor in anticipation of new government 
contracts.  See THE LABOUR YEAR BOOK 1919, at 99 (1919) [hereinafter LABOUR YEAR 
BOOK].  The scheme was so unpopular that it was abolished in October 1917.  Id. at 104; 
see HARDACH, supra, at 189. 
102 See WRIGLEY, supra note 99, at 6–7. 
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government proposed to use ordinary criminal courts for this purpose, 
but the Labour Party, harboring longstanding suspicions of 
magistrates and judges,103 resisted this plan.  Conceding that it was 
not expedient to treat labor questions as criminal law matters, the 
Home Secretary placated workers by agreeing to establish more 
appropriate “domestic” bodies.104  The government created two types 
of munitions tribunals: ten “general” tribunals to deal with major 
offenses under the act, such as striking or poaching employees from 
competing firms; and fifty-five “local” tribunals to handle routine 
matters, such as employers denying leaving certificates or workers 
infringing work rules.105  Both general and local tribunals consisted 
of a chairman and an even number of lay “assessors,” half of whom 
represented employers and half employees.106  By December 1915 
the tribunals controlled more than a million workers in Britain.107   In 
 
103 See 4 HISTORY OF THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS, PART II: THE REGULATION OF 
LABOUR 11 (1918) [hereinafter HISTORY]; WRIGLEY, supra note 99, at 112; G.R. Rubin, 
The Origins of Industrial Tribunals: Munitions Tribunals During the First World War, 6 
INDUS. L.J. 149, 153 (1977).  According to Arthur Henderson, President of the Board of 
Education, munitions tribunals were created because the government desired “not to have 
the men taken before the magistrates and to feel possibly that they were not getting their 
cases considered always by men of a more sympathetic nature.”  72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th 
ser.) (July 1, 1915) 2079.  On labor hostility to the judiciary in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, see Rachel Vorspan, The Political Power of Nuisance Law: 
Labor Picketing and the Courts in Modern England, 1871–Present, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 593, 
609–43 (1998). 
104 Sir John Simon, the Home Secretary, declared that the object was to secure 
“something in the nature of a domestic tribunal.  You do not want to carry the workmen, or 
the employer either, in a matter of this sort before a Police Court in order to deal with it as 
if this was a criminal matter.”  72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (June 28, 1915) 1548.  
Similarly, Arthur Henderson stated that the government wanted to “take all the cases right 
away from the Police Court” and have them dealt with by a “domestic court.”  Id. at 2077–
78 (July 1, 1915); see id. at 1550, 1588; see also De Minimis, 34 LAW NOTES 321, 322 
(1915). 
105 See HISTORY, supra note 103, at 12; RUBIN, supra note 99, at 2; Munitions 
Tribunals, supra note 101, at 153–54.  Whereas the general tribunals could deal with all 
offenses, impose fines, and in some circumstances imprison offenders, the local tribunals 
dealt only with offenses for which the maximum fine did not exceed five pounds.  
Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 18(1). 
106 Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54, § 15(1).  The Munitions of War 
Amendment Act 1916 provided for the appointment of a woman assessor in cases 
involving a female worker.  5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 18(2)(b).  The Act also required the 
chairman to consult the assessors before giving his decision; if they were unanimous, he 
was bound by their opinion except on questions of law.  Id. § 18(2)(a). 
107 See Chris Wrigley, Introduction, in CHALLENGES OF LABOUR: CENTRAL AND 
WESTERN EUROPE 1917–1920 1, 7 (Chris Wrigley ed., 1993).  In 1918, 3.4 million 
workers were involved in munitions work and more than two million were employed in 
controlled establishments.  See Rubin, supra note 103, at 162. 
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their first year of operation, they heard more than 21,000 cases, 354 in 
the general tribunals and the remainder in the local tribunals.108 
The tribunals presented a special threat to the judiciary because 
they possessed features that conveyed “judicial” legitimacy even as 
these entities remained distinct from the ordinary courts.  Their 
judicial character was evident in their personnel, structure, and 
procedures.  Eminent members of the bar, generally King’s Counsel, 
presided over the general tribunals, while solicitors, coroners, 
barristers, and justices of the peace chaired the local bodies.109  
Magistrates’ clerks, familiar with procedures in courts of summary 
jurisdiction, acted as tribunal clerks.110  The tribunals also emulated 
the courts in utilizing an adversarial system: employers and 
employees could lodge complaints against one another, and the 
Minister of Munitions could bring a prosecution against either side.111  
Cases were to be tried in open court,112 and a tribunal could not fine a 
person unless he or she had either appeared before the tribunal or had 
a reasonable opportunity of so appearing.113  Counsel were permitted 
in the general tribunals though not in the local tribunals out of fear 
that legal representation would put workers at a disadvantage.114  The 
Minister of Munitions promulgated rules requiring a complaint to be 
in writing115 and allowing, but not requiring, evidence to be taken 
 
108 See LABOUR YEAR BOOK, supra note 101, at 106; Rubin, supra note 103, at 162.  
The general tribunals heard a comparatively small number of cases since they could not 
hear cases within the competence of a local tribunal unless the matter was referred to them 
by the Ministry of Munitions.  See LABOUR YEAR BOOK, supra note 101, at 105. 
109 See Munitions Tribunals, supra note 101, at 152; Rubin, supra note 103, at 154. 
110 See HISTORY, supra note 103, at 11; Munitions Tribunals, supra note 101, at 153.  
This feature was helpful because prosecutions by the Minister of Munitions were governed 
by the Summary Jurisdiction Act regarding compelled attendance of defendants and 
witnesses, the payment and recovery of fines, and the execution of service between one 
part of the British Isles and another.  MUNITIONS (TRIBUNALS) RULES, 1917, R. 11, 
reprinted in FYFE, supra note 100, at 147–56 [hereinafter TRIBUNAL RULES]. 
111 See RUBIN, supra note 99, at 138–44; Rubin, supra note 103, at 153–59. 
112 TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 13. 
113 Id. R. 11(iii); see id. R. 12(ii). 
114 Id. R. 16; see also Rubin, supra note 103, at 158; De Minimis, supra note 104, at 
321–22.  Trade union representatives often appeared on behalf of their members.  See 
TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 16; HISTORY, supra note 103, at 12; Rubin, supra 
note 103, at 158. 
115 TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 8.  In order to maintain the domestic character 
of the tribunal, a summons to attend could be made by registered letter rather than by a 
police officer.  See HISTORY, supra note 103, at 12. 
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under oath.116  This quasi-judicial structure posed a challenge to the 
regular courts because it suggested that they were unnecessary for 
either the interpretation or enforcement of wartime legislation. 
Judicial review had not been part of the original administrative 
scheme, but labor quickly became dissatisfied with the munitions 
tribunals.  Despite the government’s intention to create “domestic” 
bodies, the tribunals acquired the aura of a criminal court.  Hearings 
often took place in a law or even police court where, as an official 
investigator reported, there was “an objectionable criminal 
atmosphere.”117  It only exacerbated the unpleasantness that police 
were frequently summoned to maintain order.118  In addition to 
resenting the oppressive setting, workers and unions complained that 
tribunal rulings were arbitrary, inconsistent, and biased against 
them.119  Statistics indeed bore out the claim that employees were 
prosecuted far more often than employers and convicted at a much 
higher rate.120  In the face of mounting complaints, the government 
 
116 TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 10A; see Kinder v. Delta Metal Co., (1916) 1 
Mun. App. Rep. 46, 50 (noting that the usual procedure was not to hear evidence under 
oath).  Under the Munitions of War Act 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54, § 15(3), the Home 
Secretary issued rules to be followed in penal offenses and the Minister of Munitions 
promulgated rules involving any other matter. 
117 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRIAL 
UNREST IN GREAT BRITAIN 93 (1917) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL UNREST]; see also id. at 
91, 112; Rubin, supra note 103, at 156.  As the National Council for Civil Liberties 
proclaimed, the tribunals, if not courts in name, were “courts in the essential fact.”  
“NORTH BRITON,” supra note 73, at 66. 
118 Rubin, supra note 103, at 156. 
119 See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL UNREST, supra note 117, at 91–92; LABOUR YEAR BOOK, 
supra note 101, at 97 (citing widespread dissatisfaction by unions with arbitrary tribunal 
decisions); G.R. Rubin, The Munitions Appeal Reports 1916–1920: A Neglected Episode 
in Modern Legal History, 1977 JURID. REV. 221, 222.  Another investigator reported that 
the tribunals were considered “peculiarly obnoxious” by workers, who found it difficult to 
distinguish them from a police court and resented the stigma.  Similarly, an investigator 
reported that “[i]n normal times the employer disciplines his own men, now discipline is 
enforced publicly in a criminal court.”  INDUSTRIAL UNREST, supra note 117, at 91. 
120 In the period between July and November 1915, 589 workers were prosecuted for 
striking and 407 of them were convicted; charges were also brought against 3074 workers 
for breaches of work rules, 2012 of whom were convicted.  In the case of employers, fifty-
five were convicted of illegally employing workers without a leaving certificate, and there 
was one failed prosecution of an employer for locking out his employees.  In the same 
period, the tribunals granted 782 leaving certificates and rejected 1343.  MINISTRY OF 
MUNITIONS, RETURN OF CASES HEARD BEFORE MUNITIONS TRIBUNALS, 1915, Cd. 8143, 
at 2.  From November 1915 to July 1916, there were 1023 prosecutions of striking 
workers, 599 of whom were convicted, and there were 12,004 complaints of breaches of 
rules of controlled establishments resulting in the conviction of 8633 workers.  The same 
period saw no prosecutions of employers for lock-out violations and only 115 charges, 
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decided to insert into the administrative scheme a formal layer of 
judicial review.  Accordingly, in January 1916 Parliament amended 
the Munitions Act to provide a process for appealing tribunal 
decisions to special divisions of the High Court for England and 
Wales, Ireland, and Scotland.121 
The High Court judges made the most of their opportunity.  They 
vigorously asserted their power of review over the administrative 
tribunals, treating them as inferior courts and determining both their 
law and procedures.  In rendering substantive decisions, the High 
Court judges construed the Munitions Act to resolve many important 
issues of national policy: the scope of the statute,122 the rate of wages 
payable to workers,123 the standards for issuing or withholding 
leaving certificates,124 the rights of unions and striking workers under 
 
yielding 71 convictions, of employing workers without a certificate.  The tribunals granted 
3225 leaving certificates and refused 5185.  MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS, RETURN OF CASES 
HEARD BEFORE MUNITIONS TRIBUNALS, 1916, Cd. 8360, at 2; see also LABOUR YEAR 
BOOK, supra note 101, at 106–07. 
121 Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 18(3).  Superior 
court review of tribunal procedures was especially important because at the trial level the 
tribunals had exclusive jurisdiction over most claims arising under the Munitions of War 
Acts.  See Hulme v. Ferranti, Ltd., [1915] 2 K.B. 426.  High Court proceedings were more 
formal than tribunal proceedings but differed from ordinary proceedings by following a 
simple and expeditious procedure and assessing low fees.  Appeals were conducted by 
counsel, though on occasion the judge allowed trade union officials to appear.  See Rubin, 
supra note 103, at 159 (quoting H. WOLFE, LABOUR SUPPLY AND REGULATION 113 
(1923)). 
122 The court determined, for example, what firms qualified as “controlled 
establishments” and what types of employees were entitled to protection against dismissal 
without notice.  See, e.g., Mayne v. Micanite & Insulators Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 1; 
Shaw v. Lincoln Waggon & Engine Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 11; Briggs v. London & 
S. W. Ry. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 43; Rawnsley v. Bradford Dyers Assoc., Ltd., 
(1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 103; Foden v. Jacquet-Maurel & Condac, Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. 
App. Rep. 237; Perris v. Wolseley Motors, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 48. 
123 Collins v. Brazil, Straker & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 27; Curnock v. J. Butler 
& Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 52; Perris, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 48; Morris v. 
Rudge-Whitworth, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 107; Scott v. MacLellan, (1919) Scot. 
Mun. App. Rep. 182. 
124 See, e.g., Bennett v. King’s Norton Metal Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 114; Acme 
Steel & Foundry Co. v. Stafford, (1917) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 53, 54; Stierlin v. Gen. 
Stores & Munitions Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 124; Gane v. Rees Roturbo Mfg. Co., 
(1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 129; Padgett v. Richard Hornsby & Sons, Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. 
App. Rep. 137; Knowles v. Ollersett Collieries Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 63; Taylor 
v. Samuel Osborn & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 163; Dodds v. J.L. Thompson & Sons, 
Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 63; Bayliss v. Worsey, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 68. 
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the regulatory scheme,125 and the conditions under which an 
employee could be discharged for misconduct.126  The High Court 
established uniform binding rules on all these matters,127 frequently 
reversing the decisions of the munitions tribunals for incorrectly 
interpreting the statutory requirements.128 
Even more significant than reversing tribunal judgments, the High 
Court judges not infrequently decided against the government, 
demonstrating their intention to shape national munitions policy on 
their own distinctive terms.129  In Whittingham v. New Liverpool 
Rubber Co.,130 for example, the High Court expanded statutory 
protection for workers over the objections of both the Minister of 
Munitions and the employer.  Whittingham, a packing employee, 
complained that he had been summarily dismissed without receiving 
compensation that the Act mandated.  The employer countered that 
Whittingham was not covered by the legislation because he had spent 
 
125 See, e.g., Guillet v. E.H. Bentall & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 86; George v. 
Larne Shipbuilding Co., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 82; Morris, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 
107; Orr v. Beardmore & Co., (1917) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 99. 
126 See, e.g., Payne v. Brazil, Straker & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 223; Nat’l 
Projectile Factory v. Fagan, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 75; Kilby v. Chief Superintendent of 
Ordnance Factories, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 121; Lane v. Chief Superintendent of 
Ordnance Factories, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 117; Rodgers v. Menzies & Co., (1917) 
Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 83. 
127 Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 18(3). 
128 See, e.g., Mayne v. Micanite & Insulators Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 1; Shaw v. 
Lincoln Waggon & Engine Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 11; Curnock, (1916) 1 Mun. 
App. Rep. 52; Sandberg v. A.D. Dawnay & Sons, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 70; Guillet, 
(1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 86; Abbott & Rea v. Cammell, Laird & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. 
Rep. 199; Taylor, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 163; Norris v. Lancashire Dynamo & Motor 
Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 98. 
129 Judicial independence was also evident in the decisions of the Internment and 
Deportation Advisory Committee, see supra note 96, which more often than not reversed 
the Home Secretary’s determinations.  The Sankey internment subcommittee held its first 
meeting on May 27, 1915, and sat on forty occasions during the next two months, 
considering 14,117 challenges to internment orders.  Though the burden was on the alien 
to show why exemption was warranted, the committee granted 6092 applications and held 
another 1233 for further consideration.  In the following seven months, the subcommittee 
dealt with an additional 2076 applications, recommending favorably on 1211.  See BIRD, 
supra note 6, at 96.  Viscount Cave pointed out in February 1917 that nearly all the 20,000 
aliens still at liberty had been recommended for exemption by the Advisory Committee.  
Id. at 118.  Though critics complained that the Committee had no real power — it was 
appointed by the government, could be instantly dismissed by the government, and could 
not insist on a person’s release, see “NORTH BRITON,” supra note 73, at 61 — the 
government insisted that the Committee’s advice was always followed, see 80 PARL. DEB., 
H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 2, 1916) 1247; see also BIRD, supra note 6, at 97. 
130 (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 98. 
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only twenty percent of his time packing military goods.  The Minister 
had previously circulated a memorandum interpreting the Munitions 
Act to apply only to workers engaged in “substantial” munitions 
work, and twenty percent was arguably inadequate to satisfy this 
standard.  Mr. Justice Atkin, however, noting that his view differed 
significantly from that of the Minister, concluded that the statute 
applied in Whittingham’s case.131  He pointed out that it merely 
required that an employee work “on or in connection with munitions 
work,” interposing no such qualification as “substantially 
employed.”132 
Similarly, the judiciary reached decisions independent of the 
government on the appropriate wage rate for workers, repeatedly 
announcing that such a critical matter was its own responsibility and 
not that of the Minister of Munitions.  In Collins v. Brazil, Straker & 
Co.,133 for example, four employees in Bristol charged their employer 
with reneging on a promise to pay them a particular wage.  The 
employer’s defense, backed by the Minister of Munitions, was that 
the employees were receiving exactly the salary that the Ministry had 
authorized, which was less than the sum agreed upon between 
workers and employer.  Mr. Justice Atkin declared that the amount of 
remuneration was not for the Minister to decide: the worker need only 
satisfy the court, not the Minister, of the wages to which he was 
entitled.134  Similarly, other rulings on the merits departed from the 
stated policy of the Minister of Munitions.135 
Revealingly, while the judges readily rejected the position of the 
government, they were deeply reluctant to eschew their own 
precedents.  Where common law rules arguably factored into the 
 
131 Id. at 106. 
132 Id. at 104. 
133 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 27. 
134 Id. at 40. 
135 See, e.g., Briggs v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 43 (rejecting 
the Minister’s position that repairing navy locomotives was not “munitions work” within 
the meaning of the Act); Curnock v. J. Butler & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 52 
(rejecting the Minister’s view of the applicability of an agreement between employers and 
unions in determining the rate of wages); Rawnsley v. Bradford Dyers Ass’n, Ltd., (1916) 
1 Mun. App. Rep. 103 (rejecting the Minister’s view that a worker was not engaged in 
munitions work and therefore not entitled to compensation in lieu of notice upon 
dismissal); Cook v. Haslam Foundry & Eng’g Co., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 8 (rejecting 
the Minister’s policy that it was not generally in the national interest for a man to change 
his employment to obtain overtime work); Lane v. Chief Superintendent of Ordnance 
Factories, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 117 (rejecting the Minister’s contention that an 
employee was guilty of misconduct for being under the influence of alcohol). 
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analysis, the courts invariably treated them as dispositive.  For 
example, in Payne v. Brazil, Straker & Co.,136 the court rejected an 
employee’s claim of unjust dismissal in light of a restrictive common 
law rule allowing an employer to dismiss a worker for misconduct 
even if the misconduct was unknown to the employer at the time of 
discharge.  The worker argued that the common law rule did not 
apply to claims under the Munitions Act,137 but the court concluded 
otherwise.  Similarly, in Hinchley v. A.V. Roe & Co.138 the court 
relied on a common law rule to deny a claim of wrongful discharge 
brought by workers who had mistakenly remained on the job while 
filing their complaint.139  These decisions adverse to labor were at 
odds with the High Court’s generally sympathetic stance toward 
workers, suggesting that institutional loyalty was a paramount factor 
in determining substantive judicial results. 
In addition to deciding the legal rules that the tribunals would 
apply, the courts also controlled the procedures that would govern.  
For example, operating within the parameters set by regulation, the 
High Court issued specific rulings with respect to the form of the 
complaint.140  It further determined evidentiary requirements, 
establishing that testimony under oath was unnecessary since 
munitions tribunals were “emergency Courts” that administered 
justice “in very difficult circumstances, and with all possible 
speed.”141  Frequently, the High Court demonstrated its lack of 
 
136 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 223. 
137 Id. at 225.  The position of the worker was that the employer could only rely on the 
actual ground for dismissal.  Id. 
138 (1919) 3 Mun. App. Rep. 50. 
139 Nonetheless, the judge suggested in dicta that the employers had probably breached 
the contract of employment and that the workers might have a remedy in damages.  Id. at 
57–58; see Gorman v. Luke & Spencer, Ltd., (1919) 3 Mun. App. Rep. 59 (ruling in favor 
of the employer on common law principles but again suggesting that the employer might 
have breached the contract of employment); Morgan v. Fraser & Chalmers, Ltd., (1916) 1 
Mun. App. Rep. 109 (holding that the amount owed a worker in compensation for 
dismissal without notice must be determined on common law damages principles); see 
also Hoyle v. Harland & Wolff, Ltd., (1918) 3 Mun. App. Rep. 18; Acme Steel & Foundry 
Co. v. Fulton, (1919) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 186. 
140 See G. Inglis & Co. v. Walker, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 10; Swales v. Great E. 
Ry. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 189; Shelton Iron, Steel & Coal Co. v. Hassall, (1916) 1 
Mun. App. Rep. 208. 
141 Scottish Tube Co. v. M’Gillivray, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 16, 17.  The judge 
noted, however, that more formality was required if the case involved a penalty.  Id. at 18. 
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deference to the government by disagreeing with the Minister of 
Munitions as to the requisite procedures.142 
The superior courts exercised control over the munitions tribunals 
not only through their statutory power of review but through a more 
traditional channel as well.  Refusing to view the statutory appeal 
procedure as ousting their ordinary jurisdiction, the courts also 
exercised oversight over the tribunals via the prerogative writs.  In R. 
v. Newcastle Munitions Tribunal ex parte Lloyd George,143 the 
King’s Bench affirmed that it had the same power to review a tribunal 
that it enjoyed over an inferior court.  The case involved a munitions 
tribunal that refused to entertain a complaint from the Minister of 
Munitions about ship workers who rejected an instruction to work 
overtime.  The Divisional Court granted a writ of certiorari directing 
the tribunal to show cause why it declined to hear the case.  Calling 
attention to this decision, the Law Journal found it noteworthy that 
the High Court characterized the munitions tribunals as inferior courts 
whose exercise of jurisdiction it could regulate.144  The case was 
decided in November 1915, only three months after passage of the 
statute authorizing the tribunals.  Obviously, the courts had acted 
quickly to assert over these bodies their traditional as well as special 
powers of supervision. 
2.  Military Service Tribunals Under the Military Service Act 
The “judicial” character of wartime administrative bodies and the 
consequent threat they presented to the traditional courts was equally 
pronounced in tribunals established to adjudicate claims for military 
exemption.  Introducing conscription for the first time in British 
history, the Military Service Act of 1916145 excused persons in 
certain categories.  An individual could obtain a waiver from military 
service if he worked in an essential occupation, was a conscientious 
objector, or suffered from ill-health or other hardship.146  The Act 
 
142 For example, in Shelton, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. at 214, the court rejected the 
position of the Minister that the ground of the complaint need not be stated, and in Binns v. 
Nasmyth, Wilson and Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 169, it held that the employer was not 
required to give notice of a change in working conditions in the form prescribed by the 
Minister of Munitions. 
143 (1915) 50 L.J. 530 (K.B.). 
144 Id. at 530. 
145 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104. 
146 Id. § 2(1)(a)–(d). 
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established local bodies of between five and twenty-five persons to 
hear and determine requests for exemption certificates.147 
Like the munitions tribunals, the military service tribunals boasted 
“judicial” features.  First, they were composed of men who possessed 
legal and often judicial training.  Describing the functions of the local 
tribunals as being “of a judicial nature,”148 the department responsible 
for setting up the tribunals sought people who would “give full and 
fair consideration” to the cases.149  As a result, magistrates and 
inferior court judges constituted a large proportion of the tribunal 
membership.150 
Second, the tribunal process, in the words of a contemporary, was 
“modelled on that of a law court.”151  It basically consisted of an 
adversary system pitting the applicant for exemption against an Army 
emissary known as the military representative.  The representative, 
who had a right to appear as a party and functioned as the prosecutor, 
had informal counsel in the form of an advisory committee.152  His 
role was controversial since many tribunals allowed him to sit among 
 
147 Id. § 2(1), sched. 2 § 1. 
148 See JOHN RAE, CONSCIENCE AND POLITICS: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY SERVICE, 1916–1919, at 54 (1970). 
149 Id. at 53. 
150 See JOHN W. GRAHAM, CONSCRIPTION AND CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY 1916–1919, 
at 65 (1922); RAE, supra note 148, at 57. 
151 Adrian Stephen, The Tribunals, in WE DID NOT FIGHT: 1914–18 EXPERIENCES OF 
WAR RESISTERS 377, 378 (Julian Bell ed., 1935).  Unlike the munitions bodies, whose 
procedures were dictated in part by regulation, the military service tribunals wholly 
determined the applicable process themselves.  Under the Military Service Act 1916 the 
government was empowered to regulate the tribunals, and insofar as it did not do so, the 
procedure of the tribunal “shall be such as may be determined by the tribunal.”  5 & 6 
Geo. 5, c. 104, sched. 2, § 5.  The government did not promulgate any regulations 
establishing procedures, leaving the tribunals free to determine their own.  The procedures 
adopted were generally consistent from tribunal to tribunal.  See RAE, supra note 148, at 
99. 
152 The War Office appointed an advisory committee in each district to scrutinize the 
applications and instruct the military representative as a solicitor instructs counsel.  The 
committee often interviewed applicants prior to the tribunal hearing.  Lytton Strachey 
provided one account of such an interview.  He appeared as a claimant for exemption 
before his local advisory committee in March 1916 but was not allowed to argue his case, 
as the committee maintained that it existed only to give advice to the military 
representative.  The committee members listened to him politely but at the end informed 
him that they would recommend that the tribunal grant “no relief.”  2 MICHAEL HOLROYD, 
LYTTON STRACHEY: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 176–77 (1968).  The National Council of 
Civil Liberties bitterly opposed the role of the advisory committees in interviewing 
claimants, contending that this practice was an “entirely illegal attempt to insert a military 
board between the legal tribunal and the claimant.”  “NORTH BRITON,” supra note 73, at 
69. 
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the members and even preside over the hearing.153  Nonetheless, the 
government defended the position as necessary to a full-fledged 
adversary proceeding.  As the Under-Secretary of State for War 
declared in the House of Commons, since the business of the tribunal 
was “to exercise judicial functions,” it was essential that the military 
case be “fully and properly presented.”154 
During the hearing the applicant was entitled to be represented by 
counsel or a friend, though in practice legal representation was 
rare.155  Tribunal sessions were generally public, and both the 
applicant and military representative were allowed to make opening 
statements and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.156  Like the 
munitions tribunals, the military service tribunals employed more 
informal procedures than a regular court.  They could admit hearsay 
and opinion evidence and were not required to hear testimony on 
oath.157  Another judicial feature of the tribunal system was its 
elaborate appellate structure: parties could appeal as of right to an 
Appeals Tribunal and from there, if the Appeals Tribunal consented, 
to a Central Tribunal.158  Both appellate tribunals included legally 
qualified members.159  In sum, the administrative military tribunals 
looked like courts and seemingly enjoyed the legitimacy of courts. 
 
153 See RAE, supra note 148, at 17–18, 102; PHILIP SNOWDEN, BRITISH PRUSSIANISM: 
THE SCANDAL OF THE TRIBUNALS 7–8 (1916); Lois Bibbings, State Reaction to 
Conscientious Objection, in FRONTIERS OF CRIMINALITY 57, 64 (Ian Loveland ed., 1995); 
Stephen, supra note 151, at 379.  It was difficult for tribunal members to resist a view 
expressed by both the military representative and his advisory committee.  See RAE, supra 
note 148, at 17–18. 
154 Quoted in THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSCRIPTION IN GREAT BRITAIN 
185 (Richard C. Lambert ed., 1917).  The Under-Secretary added that it was “the duty of 
the local military and recruiting authorities to place the facts completely before the 
tribunals just as much as applicants for exemption are entitled to state their case fully.”  Id. 
155 See RAE, supra note 148, at 99–100.  The President of the Local Government Board 
instructed the tribunals to discourage counsel, and pacifist organizations advised their 
members not to be represented by a friend and certainly not by a solicitor.  Id.  Not 
surprisingly, the solicitors’ organization took a different position, claiming that the 
presence of lawyers at a tribunal not only protected their clients but substantially assisted 
the work of the tribunal.  See Comment, Lawyers and Military Tribunals, 62 SOL. J. 513, 
513–14 (1918). 
156 See Bibbings, supra note 153, at 61. 
157 See RAE, supra note 148, at 100.  In R. v. Wiltshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte 
Thatcher, (1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 121, 136–37, the court observed that in almost all cases the 
tribunals exercised a wise discretion in abstaining from hearing evidence on oath. 
158 Military Service Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, § 2(7). 
159 See Keith Robbins, The British Experience of Conscientious Objection, in FACING 
ARMAGEDDON: THE FIRST WORLD WAR EXPERIENCED 691, 694 (Hugh Cecil & Peter H. 
Liddle eds., 1996). 
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Confronting the challenge posed by this potentially encroaching 
institution, the judges treated the military service tribunals like they 
had the munitions tribunals, as inferior courts subject to their control.  
In Co-Partnership Farms v. Harvey Smith,160 which considered a 
case of slander against a member of the East Elloe Local Tribunal, the 
court announced that the military service tribunals were ordinary 
“judicial” rather than administrative entities.  The defendant had 
argued that the local tribunal was a judicial body and hence that his 
statements at the hearing were “absolutely privileged.”161  The 
plaintiffs, however, insisted that by virtue of its constitution and 
functions, the tribunal was a mere administrative body.  Holding 
unequivocally that the statements were absolutely privileged, the 
Court of King’s Bench asserted that the local tribunal was “a body of 
men exercising judicial functions.”162  In other words, the work of the 
tribunals was normal judicial work.  Reaffirming this principle in 
another case,163 the court declared flatly that the tribunals were 
inferior courts with a “judicial duty.”164  A necessary consequence of 
this characterization was that the administrative bodies were subject 
to superior court oversight. 
Although there was no special statutory procedure for appealing 
from a military service tribunal to the High Court, as existed in the 
case of a munitions tribunal, applicants dissatisfied with the tribunal 
process could obtain superior court review via the prerogative writs of 
certiorari and mandamus.  In exercising their power of review, the 
superior courts determined the substantive law that governed tribunal 
decisions.  The most controversial High Court decision of the war, R. 
v. Central Tribunal ex parte Parton,165 demonstrated judicial 
independence by interpreting the Military Service Act in a manner 
contrary to government policy.  Handed down in 1916, Parton dealt 
with the appropriate construction of the conscientious objector 
exemption.  The Chertsey local tribunal had exempted Parton only 
from combatant service, and both the Appeal and Central Tribunals 
 
160 (1918) 53 L.J. 191 (K.B.). 
161 Id. at 191. 
162 Id. 
163 R. v. County of London Appeal Tribunal ex parte Febbutt Bros., (1917) 52 L.J. 62 
(K.B.). 
164 Id. at 62; see Ex parte Mann, (1916) 32 T.L.R. 479, 479 (K.B.) (ruling that the 
military tribunals were a “statutory body which would come under the jurisdiction of the 
Court”). 
165 (1916) 32 T.L.R. 476 (K.B.). 
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confirmed the order below that Parton enter the ambulance corps.  
Parton petitioned the High Court for writs of mandamus and 
certiorari, charging that the Central Tribunal had erred as a matter of 
law in finding that conscientious objectors were ineligible for 
absolute exemption.  Declining to disclose his reasoning, Mr. Justice 
Darling brusquely declared that absolute exemption was available 
only in cases of essential employment, financial hardship, or ill-
health.  It was simply “common sense,” he proclaimed, that the 
Military Service Act did not allow a conscientious objector to avoid 
military service entirely.166 
This ruling conflicted with both executive and legislative policy.  
Although the wording of the statute was somewhat ambiguous, the 
government had expressly instructed the tribunals that absolute 
exemption was an option for conscientious objectors.167  Indeed, a 
month later Parliament clarified that the court had misconstrued the 
conscience provision by amending the statute to provide explicitly 
that conscientious objectors were eligible for total exemption.168 
Rather than deferring to the other branches of government, therefore, 
the High Court in Parton imposed on the tribunals its own bellicose 
misunderstanding of statutory meaning.169  And despite the statutory 
amendment in May 1916, the High Court’s influence continued for 
the duration of the war, with many tribunals relying on Parton to 
require conscientious objectors to serve in non-combatant 
capacities.170 
 
166 Id. at 477.  A contemporary observed that Mr. Justice Darling conducted the case 
“with little dignity or self-restraint.”  GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 73. 
167 See 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 21, 1916) 412; 81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th 
ser.) (Mar. 23, 1916) 353.  Just the previous month, on March 23, 1916, the President of 
the Local Government Board had written to all tribunals clarifying that absolute exemption 
was available, and four days later he reaffirmed his position at a conference of tribunal 
chairmen.  See GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 83; RAE, supra note 148, at 118–30. 
168 Military Service Act (Sess. 2), May 25, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 15, § 4(3). 
169 The courts also dealt substantively with other matters of conscription policy.  See, 
e.g., Towler v. Sutton, (1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 46 (holding that the refusal of a recruiting 
officer to allow an atheist to affirm rather than swear constituted a rejection of his 
enlistment); R. v. Wiltshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte Thatcher, (1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 121 
(establishing the requirements for an occupational exemption); R. v. Essex Tribunal ex 
parte Pikesley, (1918) 82 J.P. 1, 2 (C.A.) (holding that a national security regulation was 
not ultra vires unless it was “utterly unreasonable”). 
170 See, e.g., ARTHUR MARWICK, BRITAIN IN THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR: WAR, 
PEACE AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1900–1967, at 70 (1968); RAE, supra note 148, at 120; 
Bibbings, supra note 153, at 65. 
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In addition to issuing decisions constraining the tribunals in matters 
of substantive law, the superior courts also determined tribunal 
procedures.  As the government had declined to promulgate 
procedural regulations, under statute the tribunals were free to design 
their own rules.171  The superior courts insisted on reviewing them 
nonetheless.  For example, the conscientious objector in Parton also 
raised the procedural claim that he was entitled to be heard orally 
before the Central Tribunal.172  Mr. Justice Darling, however, 
confirmed the tribunal’s right to render a decision based on written 
materials alone.173  The High Court issued numerous other 
instructions to tribunals regarding the hearing and appellate processes, 
and in so doing bent legislative and executive instruments to its will, 
often treating statutory and regulatory requirements as mere 
dispensable formalities.174 
Thus, due to the judges’ zealous pursuit of their institutional self-
interest, the munitions and military service tribunals never evolved 
into administrative agencies capable of supplanting the courts.  The 
very fact that they were “judicial” entities, employing judicial 
personnel and procedures, allowed the superior courts to regard them 
as subordinate bodies within their sphere of authority.  That is, the 
precise reason the tribunals constituted a threat to the traditional 
judges ultimately inured to the latter’s advantage, legitimating their 
efforts to bring these bodies under judicial rather than executive 
control. 
C.  Military Courts in Ireland: The Challenge of Competing 
Jurisdiction over Civilians 
An even more serious threat to traditional court authority was the 
creation of military courts in Ireland to adjudicate offenses committed 
by civilians.  The civil courts not only resisted military encroachment 
but also turned the tables on the military authorities: they treated the 
 
171 See Stephen, supra note 151, at 148. 
172 R. v. Central Tribunal ex parte Parton, (1916) 32 T.L.R. 476 (K.B.).  The Central 
Tribunal did not generally hear the parties in person.  See RAE, supra note 148, at 104. 
173 Parton, (1916) 32 T.L.R. at 477.  The court held that the tribunals were free to adopt 
a procedure that was “not that of the King’s Bench Division.”  Id.  It relied on a recent 
decision by the House of Lords, Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120 
(H.L.), which rejected the notion that judicial methods or procedures necessarily applied to 
actions by a local governmental authority.  See Bibbings, supra note 153, at 62. 
174 See infra text accompanying notes 360–96. 
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military entities as they did magistrates’ courts and administrative 
tribunals — as “inferior courts” subject to their oversight and review. 
As noted, the judiciary in England repulsed a military challenge to 
its authority by restoring jury trial after a seven-month period in 
which civilians were subject to court-martial for breaching DORA 
regulations.175  In Ireland, military jurisdiction over civilians had a 
longer and far deeper tenure.  In 1916 and again in 1920, the British 
government declared martial law in certain Irish counties and 
suspended operation of the DORA provision restoring jury trial.  
Even in areas not under martial law, special legislation for Ireland 
authorized court-martial of citizens for ordinary crimes.  Throughout 
the period of Irish conflict, this expansive military jurisdiction 
threatened to undermine the authority of the regular courts.  Yet the 
civil courts never ceased to function; indeed, they entertained a 
prolonged series of civilian challenges to military trials pursuant to 
the writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, and prohibition.  Events in 
Ireland during and immediately after World War I provide a useful 
case study of the intersection of civil and military justice, and they 
demonstrate yet again the forceful reaction of the common law judges 
to perceived threats to their jurisdiction. 
1.  The Legal Framework: Statutory Courts-Martial and Military 
Tribunals 
The British government first declared martial law in Ireland during 
the Easter Rebellion of April 1916,176 triggering a DORA provision 
that authorized court-martial of civilians during a “military 
emergency.”177  The DORA court-martial regime included imposing 
the death penalty where the accused had acted with the intention of 
assisting the enemy.178  Immediately following the rebellion, 3419 
Irish civilians were arrested and 2006 were tried by DORA courts-
 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 60–69. 
176 See 81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Apr. 26, 1916) 2483 (H.H. Asquith); EWING & 
GEARTY, supra note 2, at 339. 
177 The provision stated: “In the event of invasion or other special military emergency 
arising out of the present war, His Majesty may by Proclamation forthwith suspend the 
operation of this section [establishing jury trial], either generally or as respects any area 
specified in the Proclamation . . . .”  DORA (Amendment) Act Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 
34, § 7. 
178 DORA Consol. Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1(4). 
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martial; of these, ninety received the death penalty and fifteen were 
executed.179 
Martial law was lifted in November 1916,180 but courts-martial for 
civilians reappeared in response to a second outbreak of guerilla 
activity against the British government in 1920.181  Parliament 
reacted by passing the Restoration and Maintenance of Order in 
Ireland Act (“ROIA”),182 which enlarged the court-martial provisions 
of DORA to allow military trial of civilians not only for national 
security violations but also for ordinary crimes.183  The new statutory 
courts-martial created under ROIA could impose a death sentence 
where such a penalty was available under ordinary law, provided that 
a member of the military court was a person of “legal knowledge and 
experience.”184 
Despite the draconian nature of the ROIA court-martial scheme, 
the Army was not satisfied; it considered its statutory provisions too 
cumbersome for use against a population in rebellion.185  It therefore 
determined to impose martial law.  On December 10, 1920, the Lord 
Lieutenant in Ireland promulgated martial law in the four 
southwestern counties of Cork, Tipperary, Kerry, and Limerick; two 
days later General Nevil Macready, Commander of the Crown forces, 
proclaimed any person possessing arms in the martial law area to be 
 
179 See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 342; CHARLES TOWNSHEND, POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE IN IRELAND: GOVERNMENT AND RESISTANCE SINCE 1848, at 308 (1983). 
180 See TOWNSHEND, supra note 179, at 313. 
181 Id. at 340. 
182 Aug. 9, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 31. 
183 Id. § 1(2).  ROIA applied “to the trial of persons alleged to have committed, and the 
punishment on conviction, of persons who have committed crimes in Ireland.”  Id.  
“Crime” was defined broadly to include “any treason, treason felony, misdemeanor, or 
other offence punishable, whether on indictment or on summary conviction, by 
imprisonment or by any greater punishment.”  Id. § 1(6).  ROIA also eliminated the 
requirement in the DORA Consolidation Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1(4), that to 
be subject to the death penalty a civilian must have assisted a foreign enemy.  Although 
the war against Germany technically continued until 1921, it was effectively over, and the 
point of eliminating the clause was to reach rebels against English rule rather than wartime 
collaborators with enemy powers. 
184 RESTORATION OF ORDER IN IRELAND REGULATIONS, Reg. 69(5); see CAMPBELL, 
supra note 97, at 69.  Persons of legal experience were nominated by the Lord-Lieutenant 
and certified by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland or the Lord Chief Justice of England as 
being so qualified.  ROIA Reg. 69(5); see Whelan v. R., [1921] 2 Ir. R. 310 (K.B.) 
(involving a prisoner’s challenge to his conviction on the ground that no certification had 
been provided that a member of the court had legal knowledge and experience). 
185 See CHARLES TOWNSHEND, THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN IRELAND, 1919–1921, at 
103 (1975). 
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subject to the death penalty.186  Martial law allowed the Army to set 
up new entities of military justice known as “military tribunals,” 
which utilized a more simplified and expeditious procedure than 
statutory courts-martial.187  Among other things, military tribunals 
were not limited to penalties available under the general criminal law 
and could impose the death sentence for any offense.188  The military 
tribunals also differed from DORA and ROIA courts-martial in their 
formal legal character.  Rooted in the exigencies of military necessity, 
these non-statutory bodies were theoretically “nonlegal,” and under 
prevailing legal theory their actions were nonjusticiable by the 
ordinary courts.189  The civil judges could not therefore treat these 
entities as inferior courts under their supervision.190 
Adding to the legal complexity, DORA and ROIA courts-martial 
continued to function alongside the new “nonlegal” military tribunals, 
as did the ordinary civil courts.191  Repeatedly, the civil courts 
entertained challenges by Irish rebels to both courts-martial and 
“nonlegal” military tribunals, eagerly taking on the task of 
determining the authority of the various military courts and resolving 
issues of competing military jurisdictions. 
 
186 See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 30; EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 360.  On 
January 4 the Cabinet extended the martial law area to the counties of Clare, Kilkenny, 
Waterford, and Wexford.  See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 30; EWING & GEARTY, supra 
note 2, at 361. 
187 See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 86–87. 
188 The offenses tried by military tribunals were generally treason and improper 
possession of arms.  There were twenty-four executions for political offenses in 1920–21, 
ten pursuant to convictions by ROIA courts-martial and fourteen pursuant to convictions 
by military tribunals.  See id. at 97. 
189 In Dicey’s classic formulation, military tribunals derived from “the common law 
right of the Crown and its servants to repel force with force” rather than from law.  A.V. 
DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 183 (8th ed. 
1915).  As Lord Halsbury stated in Tilonko v. Attorney-General of the Colony of Natal, 
[1907] A.C 93, 94 (P.C.), martial law was “no law at all.”  Although it was “found 
convenient and decorous, from time to time, to authorize what are called ‘courts’ to 
administer punishments, and to restrain by acts of repression the violence that is 
committed in time of war,” to analogize these summary proceedings under the supervision 
of a military commander to regular court proceedings was “quite illusory.”  Id. at 94–95. 
190 See infra text accompanying notes 222–24. 
191 See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 32–33; EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 361.  
In areas not under martial law —w hich comprised most of the country —ROIA remained 
the primary vehicle for prosecuting rebels.  See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 36.  Dublin 
was outside the martial law area, which facilitated the hearing of challenges to the military 
tribunals in the civil courts.  See 2 NEVIL MACREADY, ANNALS OF AN ACTIVE LIFE 516 
(1925). 
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2.  Asserting the Principle of Civil Primacy 
The civil courts confronted the jurisdictional challenge arising 
from courts-martial and military tribunals directly, insisting on their 
principled right to supervise courts-martial and to determine the 
legitimacy of military tribunals.  Though the civil courts generally 
upheld the decisions of these military bodies on the merits, their 
assertions of civil control were profoundly significant.  Regardless of 
the outcome of the cases, repeated civil intrusions into military justice 
seriously hampered the military in its quest to impose order in Ireland.  
As General Macready observed, the rebels never hesitated to take full 
advantage of the civil courts whenever a military death sentence was 
at issue: 
 Seeing that as a general rule the civil courts upheld the decisions 
of the military courts it may be asked how the civil courts hampered 
the military authorities.  It was the delay and uncertainty involved 
which nullified the effect of martial law, encouraging the rebels to 
take advantage of every quibble which the fertile brains of sharp 
Irish lawyers could discover, and proportionately depressing the 
forces of the Crown, who could not be expected to understand the 
constitutional questions involved in these applications to the King’s       
Bench . . . .192 
If writs by the High Court had not run, he added bitterly, “we should 
have been saved all this trouble.”193  Indeed, he complained, the 
appeals process caused so many postponements of sentences that at 
times it became inhumane to carry them out.  This consequence was 
“fully realized by those who acted for the prisoners, and who lost no 
opportunity of dragging on the proceedings to the utmost limit.”194  
The judges fully understood that their insistence on civil review 
frustrated the government and undermined military authority.  As the 
Master of the Rolls admitted in Egan v. Macready,195 his willingness 
to review the rebel conviction at issue “unduly hamper[ed] the 
military authority in their effort to establish peace and order in this 
distracted country.”196   Although conceding that the principle of civil 
 
192 2 MACREADY, supra note 191, at 516–17. 
193 Quoted in TOWNSHEND, supra note 179, at 16; see CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 
138 (commenting that though the applications were not successful, they clogged up the 
courts and annoyed the military authorities); Charles Townshend, Martial Law: Legal and 
Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in Britain and the Empire, 1800–1940, 25 
HIST. J. 167, 186–87 (1982). 
194 2 MACREADY, supra note 191, at 517. 
195 [1921] 1 Ir. R. 265 (Ch.). 
196 Id. at 279. 
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review produced critical practical consequences, however, the civil 
courts never retreated from the position that military conduct was 
subject to their oversight and control. 
To claim civil supremacy required different strategies with regard 
to the statutory courts-martial and the “nonlegal” military tribunals.  
The traditional courts could easily treat statutory courts-martial under 
DORA and ROIA as analogous to magistrates’ courts and 
administrative tribunals — that is, as inferior “legal” courts subject to 
their supervision.  With respect to the “nonlegal” military tribunals, 
however, whose procedures and decisions were not justiciable by the 
civil authorities, the superior courts needed an alternate way to assert 
civil control.  As will be shown, they found the solution in claiming a 
right to determine the very legality of these military entities. 
a.  Civil Control over Statutory Courts-Martial Under DORA and 
ROIA 
DORA and ROIA courts-martial were statutory bodies over which 
the common law courts claimed their ordinary power of review.  
Indeed, it was well established that the superior courts had oversight 
over courts-martial.  As the King’s Bench asserted in R. v. Murphy,197 
a statutory court-martial was “an inferior Court, subject to our limited 
right of control,”198 and there was “no doubt that this Court has 
always exercised over Courts-martial, and over other Courts of 
limited jurisdiction, a power to prevent them acting without or in 
excess of jurisdiction.”199  Comparing statutory courts-martial to 
magistrates’ courts, the High Court stated categorically that such 
bodies were “always the subject of jealous supervision by the 
Superior Courts.”200  The mechanisms of review over courts-martial 
were the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, and habeas 
corpus, writs that ran to statutory bodies in their ordinary course.201  
In reviewing conduct by courts-martial pursuant to these writs, the 
 
197 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 190 (K.B.). 
198 Id. at 217. 
199 Id. at 223; see R. v. Editor of the Daily Mail ex parte Farnsworth, (1921) 37 T.L.R. 
310, 313 (K.B.) (noting that whenever and wherever the court had jurisdiction “to correct 
an inferior Court, it also has jurisdiction to . . . correct a Court-martial”). 
200 Murphy, [1921] 2 Ir. R. at 224. 
201 In Murphy the court stated: “If a Court-martial acts without or in excess of 
jurisdiction, this Court can exercise its controlling authority against the tribunal by writs of 
prohibition or certiorari, and against the governor of the prison, or whoever improperly 
detains a person, by means of a writ of habeas corpus.”  Id. 
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civil court judges asserted the primacy of civil law and institutions in 
three ways: first, where common law and military regulations 
conflicted, the courts required courts-martial to comply with the 
former rather than the latter; second, they evaluated the sufficiency of 
military procedures using abstract common law principles; and third, 
they protected civil institutions from military interference. 
A case from the Easter Rising, R. v. Governor of Lewes Prison ex 
parte Doyle,202 illustrated that the courts viewed general common law 
principles as more authoritative than applicable military law.  Doyle 
was a Dublin plasterer who received a death sentence from a DORA 
court-martial for participating in the rebellion.  His trial, like all field 
courts-martial of rebels in 1916, was conducted in secret.203  Doyle 
petitioned for a habeas writ on the ground that secret trials were 
unlawful under military law, relying on a specific rule of procedure 
promulgated under the Army Act that required courts-martial to be 
“held in open court, in the presence of the accused.”204  While 
acknowledging this military rule, the King’s Bench found it 
inapposite in light of a contrary common law principle allowing 
closed proceedings.  It was plain, the Chief Justice declared, that 
“inherent jurisdiction exists in any Court which enables it to exclude 
the public.”205  Like Norman v. Matthews,206 Doyle upheld the right 
of all inferior courts to close their doors to the public under their 
inherent common law powers, but whereas in Norman the common 
law rule was at least compatible with a DORA regulation permitting 
closed proceedings, here the common law rule directly conflicted with 
the relevant military regulation.  Nonetheless, the court in Doyle 
found the common law rule to govern, thereby affirming the 
supremacy of civil over military law. 
Second, even where the courts treated a specialized military rule as 
controlling, they evaluated a court-martial’s compliance with it using 
abstract common law principles.  The defendant in Whelan v. R.207 
objected that his court-martial had not comported with a ROIA 
 
202 [1917] 2 K.B. 254. 
203 See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 343. 
204 ARMY RULES OF PROCEDURE 1907, at Rule 119(c).  The rules were promulgated 
under the Army Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., c. 58. 
205 Doyle, [1917] 2 K.B. at 271.  The court relied on Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417 
(H.L.), a House of Lords divorce case mandating open trials but carving out exceptions for 
urgent circumstances. 
206 [1916–17] All E.R. Rep. 696 (K.B.); see supra text accompanying notes 84–91. 
207 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 310 (K.B.). 
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requirement that a member of the court be certified as possessing 
legal experience.  Relying on a plethora of treatises and common law 
decisions handed down over the previous century, the King’s Bench 
responded by applying a general common law presumption that “a 
person acting in a public or judicial capacity is duly authorized to do 
so.”208  Similarly, in R. v. Murphy,209 where an Irish rebel challenged 
his conviction on the ground that he was not given an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, the High Court 
reviewed centuries of common law precedent to conclude that the 
court-martial’s error was not fatal to its jurisdiction.210  Again, the 
civil court equated military with civil bodies and applied an ordinary 
common law principle to determine the sufficiency of a specialized 
military procedure.  Common law rules governing civil courts thus 
trumped military law even in the context of a court-martial. 
Third, the civil courts used the common law to insulate civil 
institutions from military interference.  R. v. Fitzgerald211 involved 
procedures applicable not to the court-martial itself but rather to a 
prisoner’s detention between court-martial and sentencing.  In 1921 a 
ROIA court-martial convicted the proprietors and editor of a Dublin 
newspaper for violating ROIA press regulations.  At the end of the 
trial, a military detachment acting without a written order from the 
military court arrested the defendants and conveyed them to a civil 
prison.212  The prisoners petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the 
ground that a transfer from military to civil custody based merely on 
oral statements of anonymous soldiers was unlawful.  The Crown 
argued that since the defendants were subject to military law, they 
could be moved from military to civil confinement without a written 
order.  Finding this contention to be “quite untenable,”213 the King’s 
Bench put on record its desire “in the clearest way possible to 
repudiate”214 the doctrine that a civil prison could detain a king’s 
subject without proper written authority: “To sanction such a course 
would be to strike a deadly blow at the doctrine of personal liberty, 
which is part of the first rudiments of the constitution.”215  Moreover, 
 
208 Id. at 313. 
209 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 190 (K.B.). 
210 Id. at 226–27. 
211 (1921) 55 Ir. L.T.R. 60 (K.B.). 
212 Id. at 60. 
213 Id. at 64. 
214 Id. at 63 (per Molony, J.). 
215 Id. (per Malory, J.). 
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the court-martial’s failure to issue an order left the civil jailer 
“without the protection of any written mandate”216  and therefore 
exposed to the risk of a lawsuit.  Declaring that there was “no 
vinculum or bond of union between the military and the civil 
custody,”217 the King’s Bench issued the writ of habeas corpus.  
Ostensibly protecting the liberty of civilians against overreaching by 
the Army, the court equally protected a civil institution from 
subordination to military command. 
b.  Civil Control over “Nonlegal” Military Tribunals Under Martial 
Law 
Asserting civil control over military tribunals created under martial 
law was more problematic than doing so over courts-martial.  Even 
exercising jurisdiction faced a special obstacle: the writs of certiorari, 
mandamus, and prohibition, which were directed at the judicial entity 
itself, did not run to a “nonlegal” body.  Nonetheless, the writ of 
habeas corpus, which produced an order to the authority holding a 
prisoner in custody, was always available.  As Viscount Cave 
declared in a House of Lords decision, although a civil court could 
not order a military tribunal to quash proceedings or prohibit judicial 
action, it could always instruct a military commander to release a 
prisoner.218 
The wartime judges invariably spoke of the writ of habeas corpus 
with reverence, emphasizing its importance in securing individual 
liberty.  As the Master of the Rolls proclaimed, it was always the right 
of the subject “to apply to any Judge of the High Court for the writ of 
habeas corpus, and, if the writ is refused, to proceed from Judge to 
Judge.”219  Moreover, it was the duty of each judge to “form his 
independent opinion and to act upon it.”220  Nonetheless, it is 
significant that the writ also served the judges’ institutional self-
interest by conferring on civil courts the power to command the 
military authorities.  Through the writ of habeas corpus, an Irish 
 
216 Id. at 64. 
217 Id. 
218 R. v. Clifford & O’Sullivan, [1921] 2 A.C. 570, 586 (H.L.(I.)). 
219 Egan v. Macready, [1921] 1 Ir. R. 265, 279 (Ch.). 
220 Id.  In R. v. Adjutant-General ex parte Childers, [1923] 1 Ir. R. 5, 13 (Ch.), the 
Master of the Rolls also applauded the “right of every subject of the King to apply at any 
time for the writ of habeas corpus.” 
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civilian arrested or tried by a military body could, and inevitably did, 
challenge the proceedings in civil court.221 
Even with the availability of habeas jurisdiction, however, another 
impediment to civil control presented itself: it was well settled that 
the procedures and decisions of nonlegal entities were not 
justiciable.222  As the court declared in R. v. Allen,223 a civil court 
could not in wartime “control the military authorities, or question any 
sentence imposed in the exercise of martial law.”224  The common 
law judges were thus compelled to find another way to supervise the 
military courts.  Their solution was to claim authority not to review 
results as to particular convictions but to decide the prior dispositive 
question of whether military tribunals were legitimate bodies at all.  
In every case involving the death sentence, therefore, the courts 
carefully evaluated the fundamental lawfulness of military tribunals 
under martial law.  In so doing, they considered two basic theories of 
invalidity: first, that no “state of war” existed to justify martial law; 
and second, that ROIA’s comprehensive courts-martial scheme pre-
empted the creation of military tribunals trying civilians for the same 
crimes.  In evaluating these objections, and even ruling occasionally 
in the prisoners’ favor, the common law courts again asserted the 
primacy of civil over military law. 
 
221 In addition to considering petitions for habeas writs, the common law courts also 
claimed the power to review on direct appeal a lower court’s denial of a writ seeking to 
challenge the conduct of a military tribunal.  In Clifford, [1921] 2 A.C. 570, the House of 
Lords dealt with the situation of two civilians sentenced to death in April 1921 by a 
military tribunal for unauthorized possession of weapons.  The defendants applied in 
Chancery for a writ of prohibition restraining the military tribunal from carrying out the 
death sentence.  The judge refused the writ, and the defendants appealed.  The House of 
Lords considered whether a denial of the writ was a non-appealable order within section 
50 of the Judicature Act (Ireland) 1877, which precluded appeals of criminal matters from 
the High Court.  It concluded that the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords had 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal since the military tribunal was only a nonlegal military 
committee advising the commanding officer; thus, what was appealed was not a legal 
“crime.”  Id. at 581.  The fact that the court could hear the appeal meant, however, that it 
could not grant the relief requested, as a court order could not be issued to a nonlegal 
entity.  See id. at 590; Johnstone v. O’Sullivan, [1923] 2 Ir. R. 13, 22 (C.A.) (expanding 
Clifford to hold that an appeal also lay from an order refusing a writ of habeas corpus). 
222 See, e.g., Ex parte Marais, [1902] A.C. 109, 115 (P.C.); R. v. Strickland ex parte 
Garde, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 317, 328 (K.B.); R. v. Allen, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241, 269–72 (K.B.). 
223 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241. 
224 Id. at 272; see R. v. Strickland ex parte Ronayne, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 333, 334 (K.B.) 
(ruling that once a state of war was proved to the court’s satisfaction, the court’s hands 
were tied); R. v. Strickland ex parte Garde, [1921] 2 Ir. R. at 332 (stating that once a state 
of war was established, a civil court could not “interfere to determine what is or what is 
not necessary”). 
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(i)  The “State of War” Inquiry 
The civil courts repeatedly insisted that it was their unique role to 
determine whether a “state of war” existed to justify martial law, even 
though this question seemingly fell within military expertise.  The 
leading precedent was Ex parte Marais,225 a decision by the Privy 
Council during the Boer War holding that martial law could only be 
triggered by a “state of war.”  According to Marais, the courts were 
solely responsible for deciding when war existed, and the continuing 
operation of the civil courts was not dispositive evidence of its 
absence.226  Moreover, as a subsequent case established, whether the 
military authorities had proclaimed martial law was irrelevant to the 
civil determination.227 
During the Irish rebellion the civil courts continually deliberated 
whether guerilla conflict satisfied Marais’s requirement of “state of 
war.”  The first major case dealing with this issue, R. v. Allen,228 
involved a civilian sentenced to death by a military tribunal in Cork 
for possessing a revolver, some ammunition, and a book entitled 
Night Fighting that purported to be an official publication of the Irish 
Republican Army (“IRA”).229  Such a punishment would not have 
been available in a ROIA court-martial.  General Macready submitted 
a lengthy affidavit stating that the rebellion amounted to “actual 
warfare of a guerilla character.”230  He recounted that between July 
1920 and February 1921, the IRA had raided the mail, held up trains, 
destroyed police barracks, attacked government offices, and 
ambushed and killed many soldiers.231  Since his affidavit was 
uncontroverted, the court easily concluded that a state of war 
existed.232 
Irish petitioners did not again make the mistake of failing to 
counter Macready’s evidence.  In a similar case the following month, 
the prisoner introduced affidavits from various notables in Cork— t he 
 
225 [1902] A.C. 109. 
226 Id. at 114. 
227 See Tilonko v. Attorney-Gen. of the Colony of Natal, [1907] A.C. 93, 94 (P.C.) 
(“The notion that ‘martial law’ exists by reason of the proclamation . . . is an entire 
delusion.”). 
228 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241 (K.B.). 
229 Id. at 242. 
230 Id. at 244. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 265. 
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High Sheriff, Justices of the Peace, and the President of University 
College — certifying that life in the city continued normally.  The 
officials testified that the Assizes were sitting, churches and schools 
operating, and daily business activities proceeding in their ordinary 
way.233  When Crown counsel suggested during oral argument that 
the court was incompetent to decide the matter, the Chief Justice 
bridled.  Allen, he declared, had made clear the judges’ right to decide 
whether a state of war existed, and “we will continue to assert that 
right.”234  He found the government’s contention that Macready’s 
evidence was irrebuttable to be “destitute of authority” and 
“absolutely opposed” to the prior judgment: “[W]e desire to state, in 
the clearest possible language, that this Court has the power and the 
duty to decide whether a state of war exists which justifies the 
application of martial law.”235  As it turned out, the judge’s 
independent evaluation of the military situation coincided with that of 
the Army.236  Nonetheless, the civil court held firm to the principle 
that the predicate for the military’s autonomy — the existence of a 
state of war— l ay in the determination of the civil judges alone. 
Subsequent cases, while largely supporting the Army’s position 
that a state of war existed,237 were similarly meticulous in 
scrutinizing military conditions.238  The judges seemed to rely 
 
233 R. v. Strickland ex parte Garde, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 317, 328 (K.B.).  The affidavits 
further pointed to the anomaly that ROIA courts-martials tried treason cases daily, 
indicating that there was no need for separate military tribunals.  Id. at 321. 
234 Id. at 326. 
235 Id. at 329.  He found the government’s argument to be “somewhat startling.”  Id.  
The judge also took pains to point out that he did not sit as a judge with the consent of the 
military authorities: “It is quite clear that the right of a Judge to sit is derived from the 
King and not from the military authorities under martial law.”  Id. at 331.  “So far, 
therefore, from being in any way subject to the military authorities, a Judge of Assize in 
the execution of the King’s commission is authorized to command the assistance of every 
liege subject of His Majesty.”  Id. 
236 The court noted that Macready’s affidavit, written two months after the affidavit 
filed in Allen, pointed to an enormous increase in casualties among the military forces and 
police.  Id. at 329–30. 
237 See, e.g., R. v. Strickland ex parte Ronayne & Mulcahy, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 333, 334 
(K.B.) (noting that “for the reasons just given in Garde’s Case . . . a state of war still 
exist[ed]”); R. v. Clifford & O’Sullivan, [1921] 2 A.C. 570, 579 (H.L.(I.)) (Viscount Cave 
calling attention to the ruling of the lower court that a state of war existed and that 
therefore the civil courts had no jurisdiction to interfere with the proceedings of the 
military authority); Egan v. Macready, [1921] 1 Ir. R. 265, 269 (Ch.) (stating that the 
affidavits left no room for doubt that there existed a “widespread rebellion amounting to a 
state of war”). 
238 The judges rarely set forth a formal standard for determining the existence of a state 
of war except to assert that the continuing operation of the civil courts was not conclusive 
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primarily on their own personal experience, treating it as more 
relevant than any evidence submitted by the Army.  In R. v. Adjutant-
General ex parte Childers,239 for example, the Master of the Rolls 
based his conclusion not on the government’s affidavit but rather on 
his personal knowledge of the destruction of his courtroom: 
I am sitting here in this temporary makeshift for a Court of Justice.  
Why?  Because one of the noblest buildings in this country, which 
was erected for the accommodation of the King’s Courts and was 
the home of justice for more than a hundred years, is now a mass of 
crumbling ruins . . . .240 
Taking judicial notice of the bombing of railways, the blocking of 
roads, and the torching of mansions, the judge concluded that “[i]f 
this is not a state of war, I would like to know what is.”241  In a 
subsequent case, Johnstone v. O’Sullivan,242 the Master of the Rolls 
again based his judgment “upon my own knowledge of what is going 
on in the greater part of this island.”243  He determined that there was 
undoubtedly war: “[a] guerilla war, a sort of war perhaps, but war.”244 
Though the cases generally favored the Army in their substantive 
results, R. v. Military Governor ex parte O’Brien245 demonstrated that 
the “state of war” investigation was more than a mere formality.  
After soldiers of the Irish Free State interned IRA member Nora 
O’Brien in Dublin in January 1923, she applied to the Court of 
Chancery for a writ of habeas corpus.246  She argued that a state of 
war no longer raged in the area, relying primarily on a newspaper 
report that Eamonn de Valera, President of the IRA, had issued a 
proclamation directing its members to cease all acts of warfare.247  
 
evidence of its absence.  See, e.g., Ex parte Marais, [1902] A.C. 109, 114 (P.C.); R. v. 
Allen, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241, 270 (K.B.).  An exception was Johnstone v. O’Sullivan, [1923] 
2 Ir. R. 13 (C.A.), where the Master of the Rolls applied a test of whether “the forcible 
resistance to authority [was] so widespread, so continuous, so formidable, of such duration 
that the help of an army must be invoked . . . habitually or constantly, lest the State shall 
perish.”  Id. at 25.  Tested in that way, he had no doubt that “in point of law, a state of war 
exists.”  Id. 
239 [1923] 1 Ir. R. 5 (Ch.). 
240 Id. at 13. 
241 Id. 
242 [1923] 2 Ir. R. 13 (C.A.). 
243 Id. at 23–24. 
244 Id. at 24. 
245 [1924] 1 Ir. R. 32 (C.A.). 
246 Id. at 32. 
247 Id. at 33. 
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The trial judge rejected O’Brien’s claim, viewing the cease-fire as 
merely a breathing space while the irregulars reorganized.248  
Drawing on his own daily observations, he recounted: 
It is common knowledge — a nd what is common knowledge I can 
take judicial notice of — that the Free State army has not been 
allowed to rest.  What do I see on my way down to Court every 
morning?  Armoured cars, military lorries full of armed troops, 
military patrols in our chief thoroughfares; even the approaches to 
the Courts guarded by soldiers with fixed bayonets.  When I see all 
this, surely I cannot say that we have arrived at a state of peace, for 
which all orderly citizens are longing.249 
In a surprising decision, however, the Court of Appeal reversed.  
Molony, who had authored all the previous decisions finding that a 
state of war existed, displayed his open-mindedness by questioning 
whether in this case there was in fact “deliberate, organised resistance 
by force and arms to the laws and operations of the lawful 
Government.”250  He concluded that despite a certain amount of 
disorder, it had “not been proved that a state of war or armed rebellion 
at present exist[ed] in the City of Dublin.”251  In defiance of both the 
Army and the Irish government, therefore, the Court of Appeal 
asserted its civil authority to release Nora O’Brien from military 
custody.  The case thus demonstrated the significance of the repeated 
prior statements that there were legal limits to military power: the 
principle of civil control was available when a court actually desired 
to give it effect. 
(ii)  The Issue of ROIA Preemption 
The courts determined not only whether a state of war existed but 
also whether Parliament’s creation of statutory courts-martial in 
August 1920 pre-empted the subsequent implementation of a military 
tribunal system.  Here too the principle of judicial review turned out 
to be more than mere verbiage, though on this issue two divisions of 
the High Court reached disparate results.  Whereas the Court of 
King’s Bench upheld military tribunals as a valid supplement to 
 
248 Id. at 36. 
249 Id. at 36–37. 
250 Id. at 38.  He commented that the onus of establishing the existence of a state of war 
rested on the prosecution.  Further, he stated that “if there is war, we cannot, durante bello, 
inquire into or pass judgment upon the conduct of the Commander of the Forces in 
repressing the war,” but that if there was not war, “it is our manifest duty to see that no 
person shall be deprived of his or her liberty except in accordance with the law.”  Id. 
251 Id. at 42. 
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statutory courts-martial, the Court of Chancery ruled that the court-
martial scheme under ROIA precluded military tribunals under 
martial law entirely. 
In a series of unanimous opinions authored by Molony, the King’s 
Bench consistently rejected the prisoners’ claim that ROIA prescribed 
Parliament’s exclusive method for dealing with the crisis.  R. v. 
Allen,252 for example, pointed out that the public danger had escalated 
since ROIA’s enactment,253 and it suggested that if there was a 
problem with co-existing courts inflicting radically different 
punishments for the same offense, it was up to Parliament to 
resolve.254 
The wholly unexpected decision of the Court of Chancery in Egan 
v. Macready,255 in contrast, rejected the position of the King’s Bench.  
Molony had proved in O’Brien that judicial review was not a mere 
formality by actually issuing the writ in a “state of war” case.256  In 
this instance O’Connor, who invariably agreed with the Army on the 
“state of war” question, charted an independent course on the ROIA 
preemption issue.  Ruling that ROIA was not enabling but 
prohibitory, he nullified the military tribunals on the alternate ground 
that the power to declare martial law had been surrendered with the 
passage of ROIA the previous year: 
To hold that, notwithstanding the Restoration of Order Act, the 
military authority can waive aside Courts-martial, and sweep away 
the limitations as to punishment . . . would be a new development of 
British Constitutional Law, for which I can find no authority.  The 
claim of the military authority to override legislation, specially 
made for a state of war, would seem to me to call for a new Bill of 
Rights.257 
If the emergency was greater than Parliament had contemplated, it 
was for the legislature to enlarge ROIA’s scope; Parliament was in 
full session and presumably not in “a lethargic condition, incapable of 
 
252 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241 (K.B.). 
253 Id. at 271. 
254 Id. at 272.  Allen was followed in R. v. Strickland ex parte Ronayne, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 
333 (K.B.), where Molony again rejected the accused’s argument that the prerogative right 
of the king to proclaim martial law had been surrendered by ROIA.  Id. at 334. 
255 [1921] 1 Ir. R. 265 (Ch.). 
256 See supra text accompanying notes 245–51. 
257 Egan, [1921] 1 Ir. R. at 275.  O’Connor also noted that Egan’s crime and arrest had 
taken place on May 26 but the trial was not held until June 11, suggesting that summary 
action was not necessary.  Id. at 277. 
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energetic action.”258  Despite his view that the rebels had perpetrated 
“appalling murders, conflagrations, and other outrages,”259 O’Connor 
granted Egan the writ of habeas corpus.  He did so based on the “first 
principle of British law: that every subject of the King is at least 
entitled to be legally tried and legally convicted.”260 
Horrified at the decision, both General Macready and Major 
General Strickland disobeyed the order to release Egan.  O’Connor, 
equally furious, issued writs of attachment against Macready, 
Strickland and the governor of the prison.  He declared that their 
obstruction amounted to “a deliberate contempt of Court — a thing 
unprecedented in this Court and the whole history of British law.”261  
The issue was explosive, and since negotiations for a truce between 
British forces and the IRA had just been concluded, all sides wished 
to defuse the looming constitutional crisis.262  Without consulting 
Macready, the government released Egan.  In a statement in the 
House of Commons, the government insisted that its actions were 
unrelated to the case and continued to deny that civil courts had any 
power to overrule military tribunals in the martial law area.263  But 
the true situation was readily apparent.  As Macready complained in 
his memoirs, requiring a soldier to account to any judge “makes the 
administration of martial law impossible, and if I may be permitted to 
 
258 Id. at 274. 
259 Id. at 278. 
260 Id. at 279.  Interestingly, the Master of the Rolls observed that a court-martial, in 
contrast to a military tribunal, was “absolutely fair and impartial,” with precise 
requirements to ensure against miscarriages of justice: 
In particular, the charge against the accused must be precisely formulated.  
Contrast this with the procedure before this so-called military Court.  The charge 
here is that the accused “was improperly in possession of ammunition.”  What 
does this mean?  It might mean anything from some desperate criminal purpose 
down to some technical irregularity.  Justice requires that an accused person 
should know exactly with what he is charged. 
Id. at 278.  He thus based his decision not only on parliamentary intent but also on his 
independent view of the merits of the procedures supplied by the Act. 
261 Id. at 280.  There were two theories underlying martial law, one that it derived from 
the common law and the other that it was rooted in the prerogative.  The first theory 
encouraged a non-interventionist judicial posture and underlay R. v. Allen; the second 
justified an interventionist approach and underpinned R. v. Egan.  The precise legal status 
of martial law is still unresolved.  For a discussion of these theories, see CAMPBELL, supra 
note 97, at 123–48. 
262 See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 365.  The truce was announced on July 11, 
three days after O’Connor reserved judgment in Egan.  See id. 
263 See 146 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) (Aug. 10, 1921) 437 (J.A. Chamberlain); 2 
MACREADY, supra note 191, at 591; TOWNSHEND, supra note 179, at 187. 
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use the expression, ridiculous.”264  O’Connor, as noted, readily 
understood that his assertion of civil authority was obstructing the 
military authorities,265 but from his perspective civil review served a 
higher principle: “There are considerations more important even than 
shortening the temporary duration of an insurrection.”266  Violating 
certain immutable principles of justice, he insisted, would produce 
“lasting detriment to the true interest and well-being of a civilized 
community.”267  Such principles, obviously, included maintaining a 
firm civil presence in affairs of military justice. 
Thus, the civil courts in Ireland dealt with the problem of military 
jurisdiction over civilians by claiming a right to review court-martial 
procedures, issuing dispositive rulings on the viability of military 
tribunals, and resolving questions of the interaction between 
competing systems of military justice.  The civil courts also exerted 
their authority by insisting upon their power to review all military 
actions upon termination of the conflict, even those concededly not 
justiciable during a state of martial law.  Adhering to a principle 
elaborated by A.V. Dicey,268 the judges consistently affirmed that 
after the war they were entitled to evaluate whether the degree of 
military force exercised during the conflict had been reasonable.  As 
Molony declared in R. v. Allen,269 upon termination of the conflict 
“persons may be made liable, civilly and criminally, for any acts 
which they are proved to have done in excess of what was reasonably 
required by the necessities of the case.”270  This proposition was 
actually applied in 1921 in Higgins v. Willis,271 in which Molony 
refused to dismiss a suit by a suspected rebel against a brigade 
commander for damaging his house during an official reprisal.  
Satisfied that the action was not frivolous, the court held that “the 
 
264 2 MACREADY, supra note 191, at 590. 
265 See supra text accompanying notes 195–96. 
266 Egan, [1921] 1 Ir. R. at 279 (quoting Cockburn, C.J.). 
267 Id. 
268 DICEY, supra note 189, at 185. 
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270 Id. at 269.  He also proclaimed in R. v. Strickland ex parte Ronayne: 
 When the state of war is over, the acts of the military during the war, unless 
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and the necessities of the case. 
[1921] 2. Ir. R. 333, 334; see Johnstone v. O’Sullivan, [1923] 2 Ir. R. 13, 30 (C.A.). 
271 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 386 (K.B.). 
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plaintiff has a right to have his case tried so soon as a state of war no 
longer prevails.”272  As with the other challenges pressing the 
judiciary during the war— t he loss of criminal cases to magistrates’ 
courts, the exclusion of enemy aliens from civil justice, and the 
encroachment of administrative bodies — the common law judges 
vigorously countered the military threat by asserting the principle, and 
occasionally the meaningful practice, of judicial review. 
II 
THE MORAL IDEOLOGY OF THE WARTIME JUDICIARY 
The judges thus successfully preserved their institutional power 
during the war.  A critical question, however, was the uses to which 
they directed it.  During World War I the judges exercised their 
authority to an identifiable moral objective: to delineate procedural no 
less than substantive rights pursuant to a pervasive moral ideology 
adapted to the exigencies of war.273  An implicit but widely shared 
judicial framework was the distinction between the “deserving” and 
the “undeserving,” a Victorian conceptual legacy that the World War 
I judges translated into legal terms and modified to wartime use.274  
Ardently embracing the cause of war, they sought to embed in the law 
a distinctive set of moral values that would aid in its prosecution.  
They calculated a litigant’s moral worth based primarily on his or her 
contribution to the national struggle and allocated procedural 
entitlements accordingly.  Persons who breached national security—
criminal defendants charged with violating DORA, draftees seeking 
exemption from military service, enemy aliens petitioning for release 
from internment, and Irish patriots rebelling against English rule—
were manifestly undeserving of a robust judicial process.  In contrast, 
parties who advanced English interests in prosecuting the war, 
including munitions workers and aliens participating in the nation’s 
 
272 Id. at 387.  Heddon v. Evans, (1919) 35 T.L.R. 642 (K.B.), upheld a right to bring a 
civil suit for damages against a court-martial for assault, false imprisonment, or other 
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established the right of a soldier to seek the protection of the civil courts against officers 
acting outside their jurisdiction either individually or as members of a court-martial.  The 
holding applied also to civilians court-martialled under DORA or ROIA.  See RICHARD 
O’SULLIVAN, MILITARY LAW AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL COURTS 14 (1921). 
273 For a discussion of  the judges’ moral ideology as applied to the substantive right of 
individual freedom, see Vorspan, supra note 3, at 329–40. 
274 On the conversion of this moral framework into legal terms in the context of popular 
recreation, see Rachel Vorspan, “Rational Recreation” and the Law: The Transformation 
of Popular Urban Leisure in Victorian England, 45 MCGILL L.J. 891 (2000). 
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economic life, were perceived as worthy of procedural rights.  Thus, 
during the war judges determined due process rights according to a 
characteristic moralism rather than neutral principles of procedural 
propriety. 
The judges’ wartime moral ideology explains when they reversed 
decisions below and when they allowed them to stand.  Most inferior 
courts were not sympathetic to the parties before them: magistrates 
were generally inhospitable to DORA defendants, military courts 
were antagonistic to Irish rebels, military service tribunals were 
antipathetic to draft avoiders, and munitions tribunals were hostile to 
workers.  The judges affirmed or reversed lower court decisions 
depending on whether the judgment under review conformed to their 
own moral predispositions.  To the extent that they acquiesced in the 
rulings of magistrates, administrative tribunals, and courts-martial, 
they were not “deferring” to the executive but rather signifying their 
moral approval of the course that the subordinate body had adopted.  
In the rare situation where their moral posture diverged from that of 
the inferior court, as in the case of workers before the munitions 
tribunals, the superior court judges did not hesitate to adopt a more 
corrective and interventionist stance. 
The distinctive moral culture of the judiciary was particularly 
evident in decisions determining the procedural rights of three 
categories of litigants: criminal defendants in national security cases, 
enemy aliens in internment camps, and applicants before the 
administrative tribunals.  These varying contexts highlight the judges’ 
propensity to place moral weights on the scales of their ostensibly 
neutral judgments of law and assign procedural rights based on the 
perceived moral status of the litigants before them. 
A.  Criminal Defendants and the Constriction of Procedural Rights 
Not surprisingly, the prototypically “undeserving” litigant was a 
criminal defendant charged with a national security offense.  In 
reviewing magistrates’ decisions in DORA cases, the judges 
sanctioned a continuing erosion of defendants’ procedural rights 
during this period.275  For example, the High Court ruling in Kaye v. 
 
275 Magistrates were generally not hospitable to the rights of criminals.  See, e.g., 72 
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (July 1, 1915) 2079; 83 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) at 1101, 
1171 (June 29, 1916).  An example of a militaristic magistrate’s decision was R. v. 
Cheshire, (1917) 81 J.P. 324, where the court invalidated a special set of military service 
exceptions granted by government officials to men in their own departments.  Even though 
the Army did not object to the exemptions, the magistrate thought it was unconstitutional 
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Cole276 severely undermined a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  As 
noted, the case held that magistrates derived their power to deal with 
wartime offenses exclusively from DORA, which placed no time limit 
on prosecutions.277  Judicial rulings in the Norman cases278 further 
limited defendants’ due process rights by approving the magistrates’ 
common practice of holding closed proceedings. 
Driven by the precarious circumstances in Ireland and a general 
overlay of ethnic hostility toward the Irish, the courts curtailed the 
rights of Irish defendants even more aggressively, whittling down 
procedural protections in courts-martial to the bare minimum.  In R. v. 
Governor of Lewes Prison ex parte Doyle,279 a case rejecting a 
prisoner’s request for a public trial, the judges’ disapproval of the 
defendant and his sympathizers was palpable.  Lord Reading declared 
that Doyle’s supporters might have come into court and “terrorized, 
possibly even have shot, witnesses,”280 while Mr. Justice Darling 
proclaimed with equal stridency that allowing people to testify 
publicly would have been “grotesque.”281  Other decisions similarly 
exemplified the courts’ cursory treatment of Irish defendants’ 
procedural claims.  In Whelan v. R.,282 for example, the court 
undercut a requirement intended to protect defendants by simply 
presuming without further inquiry that the prosecutor had complied 
with his regulatory obligation. 
R. v. Murphy283 was perhaps the most egregious example of the 
superior courts’ disinclination to take seriously the due process claims 
of Irish rebels.  A ROIA court-martial tried Murphy in December 
1920 for being a member of an ambush party that caused the death of 
an English soldier.  Prior to the court-martial, the Army had 
conducted a military inquest in which two soldiers gave evidence at a 
deposition that varied significantly from their subsequent court-
 
for government departments to relieve men from military service.  Id. at 324; see 
Protection Certificates, 61 SOL. J. 732 (1917). 
276 (1917) 115 L.T. 783 (K.B.). 
277 Id. at 785.  The court also found that regulations criminalizing antiwar statements 
were in conformity with DORA even though they “were of a drastic character.”  Id.; see 
also supra text accompanying notes 78–83. 
278 Norman v. Matthews, [1916–17] All E.R. Rep. 696 (K.B.); Ex parte Norman, (1916) 
114 L.T. 232 (K.B.); see supra text accompanying notes 84–91. 
279 [1917] 2 K.B. 254. 
280 Id. at 272. 
281 Id. at 274. 
282 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 310 (K.B.); see supra text accompanying notes 207–08. 
283 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 190 (K.B.). 
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martial testimony.  Learning of the earlier testimony from a 
newspaper account, Murphy’s attorney requested copies of the 
original depositions at the court-martial so that he could properly 
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.284  The Judge-Advocate 
refused.285  The King’s Bench conceded that the court-martial had 
committed an error of law in “a matter of vital importance,”286 but it 
nonetheless ruled that a court-martial did not “exceed or abuse its 
jurisdiction merely because it incidentally misconstrues a statute, or 
admits illegal evidence, or rejects legal evidence.”287  In the case of 
the Irish especially, refusal to correct error below did not signify 
subservience to the government but rather the judges’ effectuation of 
their own moral preferences through the agency of the inferior courts. 
On procedural issues arising initially in their own courts, the 
superior court judges also consistently interpreted wartime legislation 
to favor the prosecution.  As the King’s Bench unabashedly remarked 
in Norman v. Matthews,288 a court could not construe an act passed 
“for securing the safety of the Realm with the same scrupulous nicety 
as, for instance, a taxing Act.”289  This judicial perspective was 
evident in a number of different contexts.  Regarding the burden of 
proof, for example, judges in national security cases often inverted the 
usual rule and placed the burden on the defendant.  R. v. Denison290 
considered the case of a German subject whom the military had 
banished from his home district out of suspicion that he might commit 
 
284 Id. at 194. 
285 Id.  The Judge-Advocate relied on a rule promulgated under the Army Act, 1881, 44 
& 45 Vict., c. 58, § 70, providing that testimony before an inquest was not admissible 
against the accused.  Though the rule was obviously intended for the benefit of defendants, 
the military judge inexplicably used the provision to refuse to provide documents to 
defendant’s counsel.  Murphy’s lawyer was so outraged at this ruling that he wrote a 
scathing letter to the Attorney General: “It seems almost an impertinence to point out to 
you as a lawyer the absurdity of this ruling. . . . Would anyone outside a lunatic asylum 
rule that I could not cross-examine out of the coroner’s depositions?”  Murphy, [1921] 2 Ir. 
R. at 192. 
286 Id. at 221. 
287 Id. at 226.  The court maintained that all it had to deal with in the instant case was a 
“misapplication of the laws of evidence,” not a “refusal to hear the defence.”  Id. at 228. 
288 (1916) 32 T.L.R. 303 (K.B.). 
289 Id. at 304.  The courts also easily validated police conduct in searches and seizures 
authorized by DORA.  See, e.g., Ex parte Norman, (1916) 114 L.T. 232 (K.B.) (upholding 
the seizure of documents alleged to violate a press regulation); Maire Nic Shiublaigh v. 
Love, (1919) 53 Ir. L.T.R. 137 (C.A.) (affirming that there was an urgent necessity to enter 
plaintiff’s premises and seize documents under DORA Regulation 51 rather than using 
ordinary legal procedure under Regulation 51A). 
290 (1916) 32 T.L.R. 528 (K.B.). 
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acts harmful to public safety.291  The judge concluded that the 
standard applicable to military conduct was that the officer merely 
entertain an “honest” rather than a “reasonable” suspicion.  He further 
ruled that it was Denison’s burden to prove that the military authority 
did not “honestly” suspect him.292  A similar requirement pertained to 
prosecutions under the Alien Restriction Act,293 where the courts 
concluded that defendants bore the burden of proving that they were 
not aliens.294 
The courts also disadvantaged the defense in rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence.  Michaels v. Block295 concerned a DORA 
regulation authorizing an officer to arrest without warrant a person 
whose behavior gave “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that he was 
dangerous to the public safety.296  The military authority had arrested 
Block pursuant to information about his antecedents that the Chief 
Constable of Portsmouth had provided.  The defendant objected that 
the prosecution must prove “behaviour” by the best evidence, not 
simply information contained in a police dossier.  In addition, he 
insisted that the arresting officer must witness the suspicious conduct 
himself.  Mr. Justice Darling disagreed, holding that the police 
evidence was admissible because “behaviour” included all acts of 
which the military “may be credibly informed.”297  Noting that the 
regulation was “part of legislation passed hurriedly while the country 
[was] at war,” he decided “to construe it according to the maxim, 
salus populi suprema lex.”298  This case was significant because it 
 
291 Id. at 528–29. 
292 Id. at 529.  Similarly, in Ronnfeldt v. Phillips, [1918] W.N. 328 (C.A.), the Army 
ordered a coal exporter of German parentage to leave the Cardiff area, and the Court of 
Appeal affirmed the lower court’s ruling that Ronnfeldt had the burden of showing that the 
military authority did not suspect him “honestly.”  Id. at 330. 
293 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12. 
294 In R. v. Kakelo, [1923] 2 K.B. 793 (Ct. Crim. App.), where the defendant was 
charged with making a false statement under the Act, a critical issue was whether or not he 
was in fact an alien.  The court held that the onus was upon the defendant to prove that he 
was not.  Id. at 795.  Similarly, in Ex parte Weber, [1916] 1 K.B. 280 (C.A.), the court 
placed the burden on a habeas petitioner contesting his internment to establish that he was 
not an alien.  Id. at 282. 
295 (1918) 34 T.L.R. 438 (K.B.). 
296 DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, at Reg. 55. 
297 Michaels, 34 T.L.R. at 438.  In an action for false imprisonment, the burden of 
proving the existence of reasonable and probable cause ordinarily lay on the defendant.  
See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 42 n.188. 
298 Michaels, 34 T.L.R. at 438. 
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permitted arrest even where there was no suspicion that an actual 
offense had been committed.299 
As in Whelan v. R., which applied a common law presumption to 
excuse a court-martial’s failure to certify that it was validly 
constituted,300 judges in their own courts used presumptions to 
exempt the prosecution from formal compliance with procedural 
rules.  R. v. Metz301 involved a conviction for conspiring to trade with 
the enemy under the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914,302 a statute 
expressly providing that after a person’s arrest no further proceedings 
could be taken without the consent of the Attorney General.303  The 
prosecutor did not present formal proof of the Attorney General’s 
consent at the trial.  Untroubled, the court ruled that such proof would 
simply be presumed: there was a broad distinction, Lord Reading 
intoned, between “substance and mere technicality.”304  As will be 
shown, the use of the concept of “mere technicality” also pervaded 
judicial decisions on the adequacy of tribunal proceedings involving 
other categories of “undeserving” litigants.305 
In sum, the superior court judges permitted, and at times instituted, 
serious restrictions on the procedural rights of criminal defendants 
during the war.  Significantly, they supported individual rights for 
criminal defendants in only two instances, the right to jury trial and 
the right to habeas corpus, both contexts where affirming individual 
procedural rights advanced the judges’ institutional objectives.  In 
upholding the right to jury trial, the judges celebrated the distinctive 
procedure of their own courts, and in asserting the right to challenge 
detention by a writ of habeas corpus, they bolstered their own power 
to oversee executive and military conduct.  Moreover, advancing 
these rights had only a minimal impact on the war effort since the 
right to jury trial was severely circumscribed and habeas petitions 
could always be denied after the court asserted jurisdiction.  In all 
other circumstances, the courts treated defendants who breached 
national security as meriting only the scantiest of due process 
protections. 
 
299 See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 42, 114–15. 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 207–08. 
301 (1915) 84 L.J.K.B. 1462. 
302 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 87, § 1(4). 
303 Id. 
304 Metz, (1915) 84 L.J.K.B. at 1464. 
305 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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B.  The Dual Moral Character of Enemy Alien Detainees 
The disreputable status of criminal defendants accused of placing 
the state at risk was unequivocal.  Enemy alien detainees, however, 
presented a more nuanced situation and elicited a more complex 
judicial response.  If an interned enemy alien brought a civil lawsuit 
to protect private commercial or property rights, the court stripped 
him of his “enemy character” and expressly declared him to be 
“innocent.”  In contrast, if he sought release from internment through 
the writ of habeas corpus, the court treated him as a morally 
objectionable “enemy combatant.”  Flowing from these moral 
calculations, in the former situation the alien was allowed to litigate 
his case, while in the latter he was thrown out of court. 
A major rationale for the court’s decision in Schaffenius v. 
Goldberg,306 which allowed an enemy alien detainee to sue in 
contract, was that an interned enemy was of “innocent” character.  As 
Mr. Justice Younger wrote, “[i]t is common knowledge amongst us 
that the internment of a civilian alien enemy does not necessarily 
connote any overt hostile attitude.”307  He continued: 
Many such aliens have been interned at their own request and for 
their own protection; many others profess the strongest desire to 
become and many more have applied to be naturalized British 
subjects.  And these professions may be, and in very many cases 
they doubtless are, quite sincere; the only justification in such cases 
for internment is that the State cannot take the risk that they are 
not.308 
To intern a civilian, the court continued, was “a mere measure of 
police — a proceeding connoting no proof of hostile act or intent.”309  
Nordman v. Rayner,310 a case similarly upholding an enemy alien’s 
capacity to sue in contract, explicitly referred to the internee’s lack of 
moral culpability.  The court noted that “the internment was not due 
to any moral default of the plaintiff” and therefore “could not be held 
to have operated to destroy his civil rights.”311 
 
306 [1916] 1 K.B. 284; see supra text accompanying notes 28–33. 
307 Schaffenius, [1916] 1 K.B. at 295. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. at 296. 
310 (1916) 33 T.L.R. 87 (K.B.). 
311 Id. at 88.  The “deserving” character of the individual litigants in the civil cases 
undoubtedly influenced the court in their favor.  In Princess Thurn and Taxis v. Moffitt, 
[1915] 1 Ch. 58, which allowed a defamation suit, the court noted that although the 
plaintiff’s husband was at that moment “probably engaged in fighting against this 
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The moral calculus was entirely different, however, where an 
enemy internee sought a writ of habeas corpus.  Schaffenius and 
Rayner were especially striking in light of an earlier case, R. v. 
Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station ex parte Liebmann,312  
which ruled that enemy aliens were not entitled to challenge their 
internments through the writ of habeas corpus.313  In Liebmann the 
enemy alien detainee was not morally “innocent” and devoid of 
animus toward the English; on the contrary, he was a hostile “enemy 
combatant” and “prisoner of war” who posed a serious threat to 
national security: 
This war is not being carried on by naval and military forces only.  
Reports, rumours, intrigues play a large part.  Methods of 
communication with the enemy have been entirely altered and 
largely used.  I need only refer to wireless telegraphy, signalling by 
lights, and the employment on a scale hitherto unknown of carrier 
pigeons.  Spying has become the hall-mark of German “kultur.”314 
In these circumstances, Mr. Justice Bailhache announced, a German 
civilian in the country “may be a danger in promoting unrest, 
suspicion, doubts of victory, in communicating intelligence, in 
assisting in the movements of submarines and Zeppelins.”315  Rather 
than being an innocent civilian preventively detained, in this context a 
German resident in England presented “a far greater danger, indeed, 
than a German soldier or sailor.”316  Another judge in the case, Mr. 
Justice Low, offered a similar opinion: when dealing with an enemy 
for whom “the acceptance of hospitality connotes no obligation” and 
 
country,” id. at 60, the plaintiff herself was “an American lady” who had involuntarily 
“become an alien enemy by virtue of her marriage” and was insisting “on a right which 
[was] individual to herself,” id. at 61.  Similarly, in the divorce case of Krauss v. Krauss, 
(1919) 35 T.L.R. 637 (Prob., Divorce & Adm.), the alien plaintiff was “innocent” in that 
he was domiciled in England, had two children born there, had sought to be naturalized, 
and whose wife had committed adultery while he was interned and was expecting a child 
at the time of the lawsuit. 
312 [1916] 1 K.B. 268. 
313 The court based its ruling on common law precedents holding that prisoners of war 
were not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.  See, e.g., R. v. Schiever, (1759) 2 Burr. 765, 
97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.); Case of Three Spanish Sailors, (1779) 2 Black W. 1324, 96 Eng. 
Rep. 775 (K.B.); Furly v. Newnham, (1780) 2 Dougl. 419, 99 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B.). 
314 Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. at 275. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. 
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“no blow can be foul,” it would be idle to wait for evidence of an 
overt act or “evil intent.”317 
The Court of Appeal in Schaffenius recognized and resolved the 
dilemma created by Liebmann by limiting that ruling to the context of 
habeas corpus petitions.  As the Master of the Rolls pronounced, the 
habeas issue was “all that that case decided”;318 the right to petition 
for a writ was “a very different question”319 from the right to bring a 
civil suit.  To expand Liebmann and treat an interned German as 
losing “civil rights in respect of a lawful contract”320 would “be an 
extension of the law which I cannot in any way countenance.”321  
Another appellate judge, Lord Warrington, agreed that it would be 
“extravagant” to say that internment deprived a plaintiff of his civil 
rights, as that would imply “that the first man who came along might 
go and live in his house and . . . take possession of his property and 
deal with it as he pleased.”322  Thus, for purposes of enforcing 
commercial or property rights, enemy alien internees were ordinary 
respectable residents.  For purposes of habeas applications, however, 
they were enemy combatants and prisoners of war, as dangerous to 
the realm as if they “had been captured in a German ship, or at some 
point in Flanders.”323 Moral character was contextual, and different 
causes of action seeking varying remedies produced divergent moral 
judgments and legal results.  Enemy alien internees could legitimately 
enjoy the right to sue in their own economic interests, but it was 
another matter entirely to grant writs of habeas corpus that would set 
“dangerous” enemies at liberty. 
 
317 Id. at 278.  Moreover, as the court insisted in another habeas case, an internee was 
nothing but an alien enemy to whom a “temporary indulgence” had been granted.  R. v. 
Commandant ex parte Forman, (1917) 87 L.J.K.B. 43, 45. 
318 Schaffenius v. Goldberg, [1916] 1 K.B. 284, 301. 
319 Id. at 304. 
320 Id. at 302. 
321 Id. at 301. 
322 Id. at 304.  As Lord McNair wrote in 1919, “[i]nternment merely curtails personal 
liberty, and does not destroy procedural capacity, and probably not contractual, 
proprietary, or testamentary capacity.”  Arnold D. McNair, British Nationality and Alien 
Status in Time of War, 35 L.Q.R. 213, 231 (1919). 
323 Schaffenius, [1916] 1 K.B. at 301 (per Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R.).  Later in the war 
Lord Atkinson in the House of Lords embraced the moral perspective of Schaffenius, 
stating in Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 A.C. 262, 285 (H.L.(I.)), that internment was a 
“measure of precaution” rather than a “punishment for crime that had been committed.”  
Such innocent internment did not affect an alien’s civil rights, in this case the right to sue 
the Crown to retrieve money confiscated from him upon his arrest.  Id. at 286. 
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C.  “Deserving” and “Undeserving” Litigants Before the 
Administrative Tribunals 
The judges further effectuated their moral ideology by determining 
due process rights in the administrative tribunals according to the 
perceived moral worth of the applicant.  Munitions workers, who 
were essential participants in the national enterprise of winning the 
war, enjoyed an entirely different moral status than the obvious 
“cowards” requesting exemption from military service.  The courts 
intervened to secure procedural protections for the former, but they 
permitted the tribunals to treat the procedural rights of “undeserving” 
draft resisters as mere formalities that could readily be discarded. 
1.  Workers Pursuing Redress Before the Munitions Tribunals 
In guiding the tribunals on the appropriate construction of the 
Munitions Acts, the High Court generally showed evenhandedness 
and even solicitude for workers.  For example, it interpreted 
provisions of the Act in employees’ favor in regard to labor mobility, 
often supporting workers’ applications for leaving certificates.  This 
approach was evident in Bennett v. King’s Norton Metal Co.,324 
where a firm had closed for five days to take inventory and perform 
repairs.  A provision in the 1916 Act required the employer to grant a 
leaving certificate if the worker had no opportunity to earn wages for 
more than two days.325  Mr. Justice Atkin held that even when a 
factory closed for good reason, the worker had no such opportunity 
and was entitled to a leaving certificate.  The court went even further 
in Taylor v. Samuel Osborn & Co.,326 where the company had 
declared a holiday for ten days while it made repairs to a faulty 
engine.  Employees of the company applied for leaving certificates, 
and the firm offered them temporary employment at a lower rate of 
pay than the standard district rate.  The tribunal concluded that it was 
customary to excuse an employer from providing work if a closure 
was for good cause, and it further pointed out that the firm in any 
event had offered the men jobs as general laborers at “reasonable” 
wages.327  On appeal, however, the High Court reversed the tribunal 
and granted the employees the requested leaving certificates.  Mr. 
Justice Atkin reasoned that the statutory phrase “no opportunity of 
 
324 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 114. 
325 Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 5(2). 
326 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 163. 
327 Id. at 164. 
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earning wages” must be read to mean no opportunity to earn “such 
wages as he might earn in his ordinary employment.”328  It did not, 
the judge warned, mean the opportunity to earn “any” wages or even 
“reasonable” wages.329 
The judges also granted certificates in situations where workers, 
especially apprentices, wanted to seek better-paying employment.  In 
Donaldson v. H.W. Kearns & Co.330 the High Court allowed an 
apprentice to leave his job for a position paying full wages because, in 
its view, the object of the statute was to “give this advantage to a 
workman.”331  Mr. Justice Atkin’s encouraging attitude toward 
worker ambitions was again on display in MacDougall v. Wallsend 
Slipway & Engineering Co.,332 where he set forth important 
considerations that he hoped the tribunals would always bear in mind: 
that it was “desirable not to keep workmen down,” and that tribunals 
should “give workmen who show a special skill in their trade free 
scope to rise to higher positions.”333  The High Court also issued 
decisions favorable to workers on wages,334 work rules,335 and notice 
requirements for discharging employees.336 
 
328 Id. at 165. 
329 Id.  In Acme Steel & Foundry Co. v. Stafford, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 53, 54, 
Lord Dewar held that workmen were entitled to a leaving certificate where employers 
closed their works for more than two days for repairs.  He noted that paying wages during 
repairs might be hard on an employer but “would be even harder on a workman — who 
may have no resources beyond his daily wage.”  Id. at 54; see Dodds v. J.L. Thompson & 
Son, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 63 (finding workers were entitled to leaving 
certificates when a firm closed down because of bad weather). 
330 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 143. 
331 Id. at 147. 
332 (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 27. 
333 Id. at 29; see, e.g., Gane v. Rees Roturbo Mfg. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 129 
(ruling that employers could not give out leaving certificates containing negative 
comments about the men’s conduct); Padgett v. Richard Hornsby & Sons, Ltd., (1916) 1 
Mun. App. Rep. 137 (concluding that an apprenticeship agreement could not outweigh the 
desire of a young worker to leave his work to obtain the standard rate of wages); Scottish 
Iron & Steel Co. v. Hands, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 1 (ruling that a man employed 
intermittently was entitled to a leaving certificate to obtain regular work elsewhere); Merry 
& Cuninghame v. Paterson, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 28, 36 (holding that an employer 
who imposed a forced holiday on his workmen “in the face of a protest from the whole 
body of his workmen” was required to give leaving certificates); Cook v. Haslam Foundry 
& Eng’g Co., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 8 (allowing a worker to transfer to another 
employment to earn overtime wages). 
334 See, e.g., Collins v. Brazil, Straker & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 27; Taylor v. 
Samuel Osborn & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 163; Morris v. Rudge-Whitworth, Ltd., 
(1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 107; Padgett v. Richard Hornsby & Sons, Ltd., (1917) 1 Mun. 
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In addition to supporting individual workers, the High Court judges 
also decided cases in favor of unions, holding that yellow-dog 
contracts were invalid and that strikes did not necessarily breach the 
employment contract.  An illustrative case was George v. Larne 
Shipbuilding Co.,337 where Mr. Justice Pim reversed a tribunal 
decision finding that workers who protested an employer’s unilateral 
change in start time engaged in an unlawful strike.  “I cannot hold,” 
he declared, “that men are guilty of having taken part in a strike, 
technical or otherwise, if the employer is wrongfully attempting to 
vary the contract of employment.”338 
Employees prevailed before the High Court on procedural issues as 
well.  Whereas in the military service cases, as will be shown, the 
judges eschewed legal technicalities only to benefit the Army, in the 
munitions context they lessened procedural burdens on the employee.  
G. Inglis & Co. v. Walker,339 a particularly important case, held that a 
 
App. Rep. 137; Boyd v. Climie, (1917) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 75; Scott v. MacLellan & 
Co., (1918) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 134. 
335 See, e.g., Gloucester Ry. Carriage & Wagon Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 81 
(holding that a worker did not breach work rules by being absent from work on Sunday); 
John I. Thornycroft & Co., v. Stonehouse, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 166 (same regarding 
leaving early on Sunday); Nat’l Projectile Factory v. Fagan, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 75 
(ruling that an employer could not unilaterally substitute piece work for time work). 
336 The Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 5(3), 
provided that where a workman was dismissed without notice, the tribunal could award 
him compensation not exceeding five pounds.  The Munitions of War Act, 1917, 7 & 8 
Geo. 5, c. 45, § 3(1), changed the compensation rule to a liquidated damages clause, 
providing that a worker’s contract could not be terminated except by a week’s notice or 
wages in lieu of notice.  For judicial interpretations of these provisions favorable to 
employees, see Rawnsley v. Bradford Dyers Assoc., Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 103; 
Foden v. Jacquet-Maurel & Condac, Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 237; Holes v. Day, 
Summers & Co., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 17; Mallon v. Harland & Wolff, Ltd., (1917) 2 
Mun. App. Rep. 1; Fairchild v. Heenan & Froude, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 61; Lane 
v. Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 117; Knight v. 
Navy & Army Canteen Board, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 139. 
337 (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 82. 
338 Id. at 90–91; see, e.g., Guillet v. E.H. Bentall & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 86 
(invalidating a company policy requiring every employee to sign an agreement not to join 
a union); Stierlin v. Gen. Stores & Munitions Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 124 (holding 
that a strike did not ipso facto terminate the men’s employment and that workers were 
therefore entitled to leaving certificates); Morris v. Rudge-Whitworth, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. 
App. Rep. 107 (upholding a union official’s claim that an employer had unlawfully 
changed the wage rate without the consent of the Minister of Munitions); Amalgamated 
Soc’y of Carpenters & Joiners v. Ramage, (1917) Scot. App. Rep. 71 (reversing a tribunal 
finding and upholding a union claim that workers were entitled to compensation under the 
Act). 
339 (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 10; see Maclean v. Yarrow & Co., (1916) Scot. Mun. 
App. Rep. 5 (upholding workers’ claims as timely on the ground that an employee was 
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worker was not required to make a formal statement of his claim in 
order to obtain relief.  As Lord Dewar observed, a worker could not 
“be expected to present his case with legal precision”;340 it was 
sufficient if he lodged a general complaint without stating precise 
grounds.341  Similarly, in Swales v. Great Eastern Railway Co.,342 
Mr. Justice Atkin expressed his displeasure with a tribunal’s rejection 
of a worker’s claim on the ground of res judicata.  It was simply not 
wise, the judge cautioned, to introduce into a statute providing relief 
for workers “all the technical rules relating to causes of action.”343  
The High Court also assisted employees by relaxing rules in 
evidentiary matters.  In Scottish Tube Co. v. M’Gillivray,344 where the 
employers protested that procedures in tribunal hearings were too 
informal, Lord Dewar concluded that sworn and elaborate testimony 
was inappropriate in cases involving leaving certificates.  Munitions 
tribunals were “emergency Courts” that had to “administer justice in 
very difficult circumstances, and with all possible speed.”345 
Although the courts approved informality to benefit the worker, 
they forced employers to comply rigidly with procedural 
requirements.  While G. Inglis v. Walker allowed and indeed 
encouraged employees to submit an informal complaint, Shelton Iron, 
Steel & Coal Co. v. Hassall346 denied employers that same right.  In 
Shelton, a munitions firm complained to the local tribunal that a 
worker had refused to follow a work instruction.  The tribunal found 
the worker guilty of both failing to work diligently and defying a 
lawful order.  On appeal to the High Court, the employee argued that 
he had not received notice that he was being charged with two 
different offenses on the same facts.  Siding with the company, the 
Minister of Munitions relied on G. Inglis to argue that a written 
complaint was the only requisite formality.  Mr. Justice Atkin 
 
entitled to receive notice of the ground for dismissal in writing before he was required to 
lodge his claim). 
340 (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. at 12. 
341 Id. 
342 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 189. 
343 Id. at 196.  The court concluded, however, that the chairman of the tribunal was 
“substantially correct” in rejecting the application for a leaving certificate, as the case had 
already been decided on exactly the same materials.  Id. 
344 (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 16. 
345 Id. at 17; see Colley v. Minister of Munitions, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 21 
(hearing a worker’s appeal though the worker had pled guilty and technically had no right 
of appeal). 
346 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 208. 
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conceded that the rules for munitions tribunals did not require a 
detailed complaint if “read strictly,”347 and he further agreed that the 
whole procedure was devised to avoid technicality.348  Nonetheless, 
in his view it was essential that the worker know the ground of the 
employer’s charge so he could determine “what his rights really 
are.”349  Regardless of express requirements in the statute or 
regulations, the judge cautioned, general propositions “inherent in the 
administration of criminal justice”350 were applicable to munitions 
proceedings.  Requiring the employer to specify the precise nature of 
the charge was not a “mere technicality” but rather a matter that 
“ought to be attended to if justice is to be done between man and man 
before the tribunal.”351  The court thus went beyond the applicable 
statute and rules to grant workers extra protections based on 
fundamental principles of fairness. 
The judges supported a worker’s procedural rights not only with 
respect to bringing a complaint but also with regard to the hearing 
process.  The High Court insisted that a tribunal must give an 
employee a full opportunity to present his case, ruling in Kinder v. 
Delta Metal Co.352 that a failure to do so “would amount to a denial 
of justice.”353  In contrast, Thompson v. Toolmakers & Light 
Machinery, Ltd.354 limited the employer’s right to state his case to a 
single presentation.  Here, a worker claimed compensation for 
dismissal, and his employers in turn charged him with misconduct.  
As the rules permitted, they submitted their evidence by letter rather 
than in person.355  When the tribunal decided in favor of the 
employee, the employers asked to present evidence before the High 
Court.  Mr. Justice Atkin rejected their request on the ground that an 
employer was expected to support a charge of misconduct by 
“evidence capable of being tested.”356  If he failed to do so for any 
reason, the employer could not expect the court to “give him facilities 
 
347 Id. at 216. 
348 Id. 
349 Id. at 217. 
350 Id. at 219. 
351 Id. 
352 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 46. 
353 Id. at 52. 
354 (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 145. 
355 TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 12(b). 
356 Thompson, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. at 147. 
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for further litigating the question of fact.”357  Along the same lines, 
the court in Robinson & Co. v. Kerr358 rejected an employer’s request 
to submit additional evidence.  Observing that a party must attend 
punctually in his own interest, the court refused to excuse the 
employer’s failure to appear in person due to alleged pressures of 
work.  G. Inglis & Co. v. Walker359 went even further, precluding an 
employer from presenting additional evidence even though the 
vagueness of the worker’s complaint had misled him as to the nature 
of the charge.  The High Court thus systematically molded procedures 
in the munitions tribunals to ensure a full judicial process for workers 
rendering patriotic service to the state, while at the same time 
demanding that employers comply with every procedural technicality. 
2.  Draftees Seeking Exemption from Military Service Tribunals 
In striking contrast to the solicitude they displayed for munitions 
workers, the High Court judges exhibited unrelenting antagonism 
toward draftees seeking to quash a conscription order, and their 
antipathy permeated judicial decisions on both substance and 
procedure.  As noted, R. v. Central Tribunal ex parte Parton,360 the 
controversial decision holding that conscientious objectors were not 
entitled to absolute exemption, revealed the court’s obvious 
repugnance toward applicants for exemption.  During oral argument 
Mr. Justice Darling suggested that Parton had “the same objection to 
saving life as to taking it,”361 since protection for life and property 
“finally depends on force.”362  Mincing no words, the judge lectured 
the courtroom that Parton “ought really to be an outlaw, ought he 
not?”363  Parton seems to have aroused particular judicial disdain 
because he was financially dependent on his father, the managing 
 
357 Id.  In Scottish Iron & Steel Co. v. Hands, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 1, the court 
again held that the employers were not permitted to offer further proof when they failed to 
do so below: “This Court has wide powers, and may call for inquiry at any stage; but that 
is a power which ought to be exercised with discrimination.”  Id. at 3; see Ritchie, Graham 
& Milne v. Dougan, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 8 (holding that a statement in writing 
rather than a personal appearance was not sufficient to support an employer’s charge of 
misconduct). 
358 (1917) Scot. Mun App. Rep. 81. 
359 (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 10. 
360 (1916) 32 T.L.R. 476 (K.B.). 
361 Id. at 476. 
362 Id. 
363 Id. 
 468 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 401 
director of a munitions factory.364  From a moral perspective, the 
substantive result in the case was entirely predictable. 
Parton also lost on his procedural claim that the Central Tribunal 
was obliged to hear him in person,365 and virtually every other 
applicant for a military service exemption suffered the same fate at 
the hands of the High Court.  Repeatedly, the judges excused the 
Army from strict compliance with procedures mandated by statute or 
regulation.  In R. v. Lincolnshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte 
Stubbins,366 for example, both the King’s Bench and the Court of 
Appeal held that the military representative need not satisfy notice 
requirements with rigor.  Stubbins, the applicant, had received an 
award of total exemption from his local tribunal but lost it in the 
Appeal Tribunal.  He complained to the High Court that he had not 
received proper notice of the military representative’s appeal.  In 
rejecting his claim, the court may well have been influenced by the 
applicant’s particularly unattractive character.  A bachelor, Stubbins 
cited virtually every available ground to obtain an exemption;367 even 
more damaging, he was the chairman of his local tribunal and had 
presided over the session that considered his own application.368  This 
behavior hardly endeared him to the High Court, which observed that 
it would have been “more in accordance with the spirit in which 
justice is administered in this country” if he had not presided that 
day.369 
Deciding in favor of the military representative, the court held that 
giving notice to the applicant in the prescribed form was not 
required.370  Eschewing “slavish adherence to the exact words”371 of 
a regulation, Lord Reading declared that “it is not necessary to 
 
364 Id.  The Appeal Tribunal judges had reasoned that since Parton’s income partly 
derived from the manufacture of munitions, he should not be exempted from 
noncombatant service.  Id. 
365 Id. at 477; see supra text accompanying notes 172–73. 
366 [1917] 1 K.B. 1 (C.A.). 
367 Stubbins argued that he was engaged in work of national importance, suffered from 
ill-health, worked in an exempt occupation, and had financial and domestic obligations.  
Id. at 3. 
368 When the tribunal reached his own application, Stubbins stood alongside the new 
chairman while the tribunal decided the case.  Hardly surprisingly, the tribunal granted 
him a certificate of total exemption.  Id. 
369 Id. at 7.  The court observed that his behavior had given “colour to suggestion that 
the tribunal was influenced by his presence on the bench.”  Id. 
370 Id. at 9. 
371 Id. at 10. 
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comply with the letter when there is a compliance with the spirit of 
the regulation.”372  On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that the 
rules were “directory” rather than “imperative.”373  The regulations, 
which allowed a party to bring an appeal in a particular manner, did 
“not provide that it shall not be brought in any other manner.”374 
In other cases as well, the common law courts smoothed the 
Army’s procedural path in taking an appeal from an adverse tribunal 
decision.  For example, when an applicant contested an order 
reducing his period of exemption on the ground that the military 
representative had not given him the required notice of appeal, the 
court simply concluded that providing notice was not a condition 
precedent to considering the appeal.375  The regulations could not be 
“disregarded and treated as useless,” the judge conceded, but they 
were only intended to “serve as a guide.”376  Another High Court 
ruling gave the Army an additional opportunity to appeal to the 
Central Tribunal even though the Appeal Tribunal had already 
rejected the representative’s request in open court and awarded the 
applicant his exemption.377  In contrast, when the applicant for 
exemption sought a right to appeal, as in R. v. County of London 
Appeal Tribunal ex parte Febbutt Bros.,378 the court quickly 
dismissed his claim.  Observing that an appeal to the Central Tribunal 
was a matter solely within the Appeal Tribunal’s discretion, the court 
 
372 Id. at 9. 
373 Id. at 15. 
374 Id. at 14. 
375 R. v. Leicestershire Appeal Tribunal ex parte Tivey, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 807. 
376 Id. at 809. 
377 R. v. Cent. Tribunal ex parte Syddall, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 1483.  The tribunal had 
followed its oral rejection of the military representative’s request to appeal with a later 
written decision granting it.  The court reasoned that the later written decision was more 
“formal” than the oral courtroom decision and thus superseded it.  Id. at 1485.  Where it 
benefitted the military representative, apparently, more formality was required.  The court 
noted that the fact that the applicant had already received his exemption might have been 
an “irregularity,” but it did not affect the matter.  Id.  In another case, R. v. Yorkshire 
Appeal Tribunal ex parte Barker, (1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 599, the tribunal admitted that it had 
granted the applicant leave to appeal to the Central Tribunal “to get rid of him.”  Id. at 600.  
The court, suggesting that tribunal members “would have done better to have kept [the 
reason] to themselves,” id., let the appeal stand but refused to grant the applicant costs.  As 
it observed with disapproval, “[t]he whole matter does not justify him in coming to this 
Court and setting its machinery in motion.”  Id. 
378 (1917) 52 L.J. 62 (K.B.). 
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declined to issue a writ of mandamus even to correct an erroneous 
decision.379 
The courts excused the military representative from compliance 
with formal requirements in other aspects of the tribunal process as 
well.  Unlike in munitions tribunals cases, where the High Court 
placed a burden on the employer to explain the ground of his or her 
opposition,380 in draft exemption cases it imposed no such obligation 
on the military representative.  In R. v. Wiltshire Appeal Tribunal ex 
parte Thatcher,381 for example, the court merely observed that when 
the applicant learned that “his claim for absolute exemption was 
coming on,” he had received notice of “all that they were required to 
give.”382  Nor, as the court concluded in another case,383 did the 
failure of the military representative to contest an exemption preclude 
the tribunal from acting adversely to the applicant.  The King’s Bench 
ruled that although the regulations prescribed a procedure for raising 
an objection, the military representative’s failure to follow that 
procedure was of no consequence.384 
The courts’ procedural bias against applicants for military 
exemption was equally apparent in judicial rulings on the requisite 
evidentiary process at a tribunal hearing.  The Army, it appeared, 
could prevail without providing any evidence at all.  In R. v. Cardiff 
Local Tribunal ex parte Granger,385 the court approved withdrawal 
of an exemption for essential employment even though the military 
representative had not proven that the applicant would better serve the 
national interest by joining the Army.  The judge acknowledged that 
the regulations required the military representative to satisfy the 
military tribunal of this fact, but it interpreted the regulation not to 
“require that there should be any evidence adduced.”386  Conversely, 
the courts limited the draftee’s ability to develop his factual and legal 
 
379 Id. at 62. 
380 See supra text accompanying notes 346–51. 
381 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 121. 
382 Id. at 139. 
383 R. v. Grimsby Appeal Tribunal ex parte Daley, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 1253. 
384 See R. v. Hampshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte Handley, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 1463 
(ruling that the military representative’s failure to give the applicant notice of his objection 
to an exemption did not compel a tribunal to grant the exemption). 
385 (1918) 34 T.L.R. 553. 
386 Id. at 554.  Similarly, in R. v. Lincolnshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte East, (1916) 86 
L.J.K.B. 598, where a farmer claimed that working his farm was in the national interest 
and noted that the military representative did not object or call evidence in opposition, the 
court ruled that the tribunal could still refuse to grant an exemption. 
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arguments.  In R. v. Wiltshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte Thatcher,387 
the Court of Appeal allowed the tribunal to cut short the applicant’s 
evidentiary case.  “An applicant is not entitled to persevere for as long 
as he pleases,”388 the court sternly announced, observing that tribunal 
members could ascertain the facts by drawing inferences from the 
applicant’s other statements and were not bound to hear additional 
evidence.389 
If the tribunal was not required to hear the whole of an applicant’s 
presentation of facts, neither was it obligated to hear his entire 
argument on the law.  In R. v. Hendon Local Tribunal ex parte 
Watson,390 the draftee complained that a member of the tribunal had 
been absent for part of his solicitor’s argument.  The King’s Bench 
held that although such conduct violated military service regulations, 
it was a matter of “technical infringement”391 with which the court 
would not interfere.  With monotonous regularity, the judges made 
clear that they would not intervene to remedy “technical 
infringements” of applicants’ procedural rights. 
Collectively, the import of these decisions was undeniable.  
Virtually without exception the judges gave the military 
representative the benefit of every procedural doubt but refused the 
same courtesy to the applicant.  In R. v. Westminster Local Tribunal 
ex parte Smart,392 for example, the King’s Bench refused to excuse 
an applicant’s failure to show up at his hearing even though he held 
an apparently reasonable belief that the hearing had been adjourned.  
Such a mistake, the court concluded, was no reason for the court to 
require the tribunal to adjudicate his application.  But even meticulous 
attention to procedural detail did not necessarily avail the draftee, as it 
only aroused judicial concern that he would manipulate procedural 
devices to win an exemption.  In R. v. Hertfordshire Appeal Tribunal 
ex parte Hills,393 the tribunal refused to grant an exemption and 
subsequently denied the draftee’s application for a rehearing.  When 
the applicant appealed to the High Court, the King’s Bench refused to 
hear the case.  According to Lord Reading, depriving the tribunal of 
 
387 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 121. 
388 Id. at 138. 
389 Id. at 140. 
390 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 1256. 
391 Id. at 1256. 
392 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 738. 
393 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 584. 
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the right to decide whether to rehear a case would lead to “manifest 
absurdity” because there would be no finality of decision.394  An 
applicant, he claimed, could appeal repeatedly until the end of the war 
and would doubtless succeed eventually in obtaining the military 
service exemption that the tribunal had refused.395  The court reached 
this decision over a strong dissent pointing out that the statute granted 
applicants an unrestricted right to appeal and contained no language 
whatsoever suggesting that a decision on rehearing fell outside its 
broad general terms.396 
The courts’ tendency to discriminate between applicants before the 
two types of tribunal was thus readily apparent.  The superior courts 
shaped the legal process in the military service tribunals by relaxing 
requirements for the Army while holding the conscript to strict 
compliance, but in the munitions tribunals they promoted informality 
to support the worker while tightening procedural obligations on the 
employer.  Whereas Thatcher excused the military representative 
from stating the ground of his objection to the exemption, Shelton 
concluded that a detailed statement of the employer’s claim was 
necessary to avoid injustice.  Parton denied the applicant the right to 
appear personally before the tribunal, but Kinder granted the worker a 
full opportunity to present his case.  And though Sydall allowed the 
military representative an additional opportunity to appeal, Febbutt 
Bros. summarily rejected a similar request from the applicant.  These 
and other divergent rulings are intelligible only by taking into account 
the wartime moral framework that informed the decisions.  As in the 
case of superior court review generally, courts reviewing the actions 
of administrative tribunals denied procedural rights to litigants they 
perceived as “undeserving” while according “deserving” workers a 
full and fair judicial process. 
 
 
394 Id. at 586. 
395 Id. at 587; see R. v. Essex Tribunal ex parte Pikesley, (1918) 82 J.P. 1 (C.A.) (ruling 
that an application to the tribunal for a rehearing could not be granted after a man had been 
called up without the consent of the Army Council). 
396 Hills, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. at 589.  He agreed on the merits, however, since apart from 
the question of a right to appeal, “I fail to see that the applicant makes out any case for a 
rehearing.”  Id.; see R. v. Hull & Yorkshire Appeal Tribunal, (1917) 87 L.J.K.B. 115, 118 
(expressing concern about issuing a decision that would “multiply proceedings 
unnecessarily”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The English judiciary thus played a critical role in the 
transformation of British legal procedures and institutions during 
World War I.  Although the government initiated wartime changes 
through statute and regulation, it was the judicial response to these 
measures that ultimately determined the contours of the legal process.  
Three particular developments threatened to undermine the position 
of the traditional courts and spurred effective judicial reaction: the 
loss of traditional jurisdiction over certain parties and offenses, the 
appearance of new executive bodies to adjudicate disputes regarding 
conscription and labor relations, and the emergence of rival 
institutions of military justice in Ireland.  The judges met these 
challenges by quickly asserting jurisdiction over aliens, restoring jury 
trial in criminal cases, supervising the courts of summary jurisdiction, 
controlling the law and procedures of the administrative agencies, and 
establishing the principle of civil supremacy over both statutory 
courts-martial and military tribunals in Ireland.  They brought 
potentially rival entities under their control by treating all judicial 
bodies, whether newly created or newly empowered, as inferior courts 
subject to their oversight.  Rather than marginalizing the judges, the 
war impelled the superior courts to solidify and indeed amplify their 
institutional position. 
An equally important question, however, was the end to which the 
judges directed their restored and even heightened powers.  In 
addition to repulsing challenges to their authority based on 
institutional self-interest, they shaped the legal process in accordance 
with a distinctive moral ideology.  Calculating the worth of the parties 
before them by employing nationalistic wartime criteria, they 
rewarded munitions workers and aliens advancing economic claims 
with a robust judicial process.  Conversely, they circumscribed the 
procedural rights of criminal defendants, Irish rebels, draft resisters, 
and enemy alien detainees who challenged their internments.  Rather 
than being complacent, peripheral, and subordinate to the executive, 
the judges forcefully molded the legal process to promote their dual 
objectives of enhancing their own institutional power and determining 
procedural rights pursuant to moralistic concepts of individual worth. 
More broadly, an exploration of judicial conduct during World 
War I suggests that the conventional emphasis in historical 
scholarship on the fate of individual substantive rights such as 
personal liberty has obscured another important perspective.  A full 
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historical understanding of legal developments in wartime requires 
attention to changes in the legal process —particularly shifts in the 
balance of institutional powers and allocations of procedural 
entitlements— a s well as to formal evolution of legal doctrine.  
Viewing the conduct of the English judiciary during World War I 
from this perspective yields contemporary as well as historical 
lessons.  The precise connection between judicial power and due 
process rights is indeterminate and elusive, and augmenting the power 
of judges is not necessarily the solution to the erosion of individual 
rights in wartime.  In fact, the British experience suggests that the 
legal process is intensely vulnerable to distortion by judges driven by 
wartime imperatives rather than by neutral procedural principles.  
Judicial power during World War I produced a legal regime that was 
moralistic, selective, and discriminatory in its distribution of 
procedural entitlements.  Understanding the contingent role of the 
judiciary during this first global conflict may encourage the 
heightened vigilance necessary to secure a fair legal process for all 
litigants in times of war. 
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